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Abstract
We empirically investigate the impacts of the implementation of Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on per capita emissions of eight air pollutants and
municipal waste. We employ the same explanatory variables and apply the same em-
pirical strategy and methodologies as in (Qirjo and Pascalau, 2019). We provide robust
evidence suggesting that the implementation of TTIP could be beneficial to the envi-
ronment because it may help reduce per capita emissions of NO2 and HFCs/PFCs/SF6
in a typical TTIP member. This result is based on the statistically significant evidence
showing that, on average, the pollution haven motive based on national per capita
income variations is dominated by the Factor Endowment Argument based on the clas-
sical Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory and the pollution haven motive originating from
an inverse measurement of national population density differences. However, we also
report generally statistically significant evidence implying that the implementation of
TTIP could denigrate the environment because it may help increase per capita emis-
sions of SO2, SOx, NOx, SF6, and NH3.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we employ the same empirical methodology used in (Qirjo and Pascalau,
2019), but now we focus on eight other air pollutants and municipal waste. Therefore, us-
ing data over the 1989-2013 time period, for 28 EU members and the U.S., we empirically
investigate the role of the implementation of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship (TTIP) on per capita emissions of eight air pollutants; SO2, SOx, CH4, HFCs/PFCs/SF6,
NO2, NOx, SF6, and NH3, and a general pollutant such as municipal waste.
We find statistically significant evidence suggesting that the implementation of TTIP,
may help reduce per capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and NO2. More specifically, hold-
ing all the other factors constant, we show that, on average, a one percent increase in
bilateral trade between the U.S. and a typical EU member may help reduce per capita
emission of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and NO2 by about 3 Teragrams (Tg) in CO2 in-equivalent and
10 Gigagrams (Gg) in a year, respectively. On the other hand, we also report potential
environmental degradation due to the implementation of TTIP. In particular, holding ev-
erything else constant, we report generally statistically significant evidence suggesting that
one percent increase in bilateral trade between the U.S. and a typical EU member may help
increase per capita emissions of SO2, SOx, NOx, SF6, and NH3 by about 360 Kilograms (Kg),
446 Gg, 528 Gg, 750 Gg in CO2 in-equivalent, and 45 Gg, respectively. In the case of CH4
we find the existence of unit root. Thus, for CH4, we re-estimate the results using the first
difference and find no statistically significant evidence for the trade variable. Furthermore,
we do not find any statistically significant evidence that indicates changes on municipal
waste per capita as a consequence of the implementation of TTIP.
Note that a typical TTIP member is poorer and more densely populated as compared
to the U.S. Thus, a poor country may act as a pollution haven because it adopts lax envi-
ronmental laws following PHH1 (Pollution Haven Hypothesis based on national per capita
income differences). On the other hand, the U.S. may act as a pollution haven because
it is sparsely populated as compared to a typical TTIP member according to PHH2 (Pol-
lution Haven Hypothesis generated from national density of population variations). Con-
sequently, it may produce the pollution-intensive goods at cheaper prices, and therefore,
export them in the EU (see for example (Frankel and Rose, 2005), which was the first em-
pirical study to introduce PHH2) due to the implementation of TTIP. In conclusion, in the
case of the above two air pollutants, the U.S. may act as a pollution haven due to the imple-
mentation of TTIP if PHH1 is dominated by PHH2. Moreover, if this is the case, then FEH
(Factor Endowment Hypothesis) may further denigrate the environment in the U.S. since
the latter is a capital-abundant country as compared to an average TTIP member. Thus, the
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U.S. would export capital-intensive goods (that are considered pollution-intensive goods)
in a typical labor-abundant EU member and import labor intensive-goods (that are con-
sidered environmental friendly goods) from an average EU member due to the implemen-
tation of TTIP. Analogously, a typical TTIP member may act as a pollution haven if PHH1
dominates PHH2. However, under this scenario, the implementation of TTIP could still be
beneficial to the environment in a typical TTIP member if FEH dominates PHH1.
Our empirical exercise shows that the implementation of TTIP, on average, is more
likely to help in the fight against global warming because it may help reduce per capita
emissions of NO2 and HFCs/PFCs/SF6. This is because for the latter two air pollutants, we
observe a stronger FEH and PHH2 as compared to PHH1. In other words, more openness
to trade between the U.S. and the EU could help reduce per capita emissions of NO2 and
HFCs/PFCs/SF6 because being labor-abundant and densely populated typical EU member
appears to be more environmentally efficient despite the fact of being poorer than the U.S.
This result is consistent with Qirjo and Pascalau (2019) who using the same empirical
methodology and explanatory variables with the current study, provide robust evidence
suggesting that the implementation of TTIP may help reduce per capita emissions of CO2
and GHGs, respectively. It is also consistent with Qirjo et al. (2019b) who empirically
analyze the impacts of CETA on four main GHGs during 1990-2016 time period. They
show that the implementation of CETA could contribute in the fight against global warming
because it may help reduce per capita emissions of CO2, CH4, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, and N2O,
respectively.
However, our empirical findings suggest that the implementation of TTIP could assist
in increasing global warming because it may help increase per capita emissions of SO2,
SOx, NOx, SF6, and NH3. It appears that for SO2, this result stands because being a poor
EU member pollute the environment more despite the fact of being labor-abundant and
densely populated EU member as compared to the U.S. For SOx and NOx, we show that
more trade intensity between the U.S. and the EU may help increase per capita emissions
of SOx and NOx because being a capital-abundant EU member pollute the air more despite
of being a rich EU member relative to the U.S. For SF6 and NH3, it appears that there is a
positive and statistically significant evidence between the trade intensity variable and per
capita emissions of SF6 and NH3 because the U.S. may act as pollution haven due to being
sparsely populated even though it is richer than a typical EU member.
In an average TTIP member, we find robust empirical evidence in support of PHH1
and PHH2. In particular, on average, we find generally statistically significant evidence
suggesting that per capita emissions of SOx, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, NO2, SF6, and NH3 go up,
respectively, as EU members get poorer relative to the U.S. due to the implementation
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of TTIP. Furthermore, we report generally robust empirical evidence pointing out that
the less densely populated countries may act as pollution havens due to the implementa-
tion of TTIP in the case of HFCs/PFCs/SF6, NO2, CH4, SF6, and NH3, respectively. More-
over, we find statistically significant evidence in support of the FEH suggesting that, on
average and under the assumption that capital-intensive goods are considered pollution-
intensive goods (for a theoretical basis on FEH see (Antweiler et al., 2001)), an EU mem-
ber with a lower capital to labor ratio relative to the U.S. will find per capita emissions of
HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and NO2 to decrease in response to the implementation of TTIP. See also
(Qirjo and Christopherson, 2016) for an empirical analysis of the implementation of TTIP
accounting for FEH and PHH1, but in the absence of PHH2.
We find statistically significant evidence, implying that the implementation of TTIP in
countries that use English as an official language may help increase per capita emissions
of NO2, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, CH4, SF6, SO2, and NH3 relative to countries where English is not
an official language. In the case of NO2 and HFCs/PFCs/SF6, this result could be because
on average per capita emissions of the latter two air pollutants maybe reduced more in the
former Ex-Communist members of the EU, which produce more labor-intensive goods due
to higher trade intensity with the U.S. In the case of SF6, SO2, and NH3, this result stands
because there is more trade due to language similarities between the U.S. and each of the
English speaking EU members respectively.
Our results show that the implementation of TTIP in countries that have sea or ocean
access may help reduce per capita emissions of CH4, SO2, SF6, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, and NO2
relative to countries that are landlocked. We claim that this result stands for the latter
two air pollutants because the EU members with sea access trade more with the U.S. as
compared to landlocked EU members. However, the implementation of TTIP in countries
that have sea access may help reduce per capita emissions of CH4, SO2, and SF6 relative
to countries that are landlocked, despite the fact that we report a positive relationship
between the trade intensity variable and per capita emissions of each of the latter 3 air
pollutants. We also show that the implementation of TTIP in countries that have sea
access may help increase per capita emissions of SOx and NOx as compared to landlocked
countries. This result stands because EU members with sea access trade more with the
U.S. as compared to landlocked EU members as a result of the implementation of TTIP.
We report robust evidence indicating that the implementation of TTIP in countries that
have adopted Euro as their official currency may help increase more per capita emissions
of SOx as compared to TTIP members where Euro is not an official currency. This is
because for SOx, on average, EU members that have adopted Euro trade more with the U.S.
We find robust evidence suggesting that more trade openness between the EU members
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that have adopted Euro as their official currency and the U.S. would increase per capita
emissions of SF6 and NH3 less. We claim that the latter result stands because they may
benefit from stronger technique effects due to trading more with the U.S., which is in a
similar stage of economic development. We show statistically significant evidence implying
that the implementation of TTIP in EU members that have adopted Euro as their official
currency may help reduce more per capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and NO2. This
result may stand because EU members that have adopted Euro could be trading more with
the U.S. due to lower exchange transaction’s costs. And more trade between the former
EU members and the U.S. is associated with lower per capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6
and NO2, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our dataset and its
sources. Section 3 presents our empirical results. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Data Description of Pollutants and their Sources
We denote methane by CH4. We obtain the data for CH4 from (CAIT, 2014).1 They are
expressed in CO2 in equivalent Gg per capita emissions. Methane is the second most
prevalent GHG originating from human activities emitted in the U.S. In particular, in 2013,
CH4 accounted for about 10% of all U.S. GHGs emissions coming from human activities.
The main sources of CH4 from human activities originate from the raising of livestock and
leakage from natural gas systems. Despite the fact that CH4’s lifetime in the atmosphere
is much shorter than CO2, the comparative impact of CH4 on climate change is 25 times
greater than CO2 over a 100 years period.
Our models denote Sulfur Oxides, Sulfur Dioxide, Nitrogen Oxides and Nitrogen Diox-
ide with SOx, SO2, NOx, and NO2 respectively. We obtain the data of the above pollutants
from the following sources: SO2 data are based on (Stern, 2006). SOx data are from
(EEA, 2015). NOx data are from (NECNFR, 2015). NO2 are from (UNFCCC, 2015). SOx
is measured in Gg per capita. SO2 is measured in Kg sulfur emission per capita. NOx are
measured in Gg per capita using the entire territory. NO2 are measured in Gg emissions per
capita. All these pollutants are released into the atmosphere as byproducts of the energy
transformation process when converting fossil fuels to energy. In the air these substances
are turned into acidifying agents, often called acid rain, and on the ground these pollu-
tants cause both soil and water acidification. (Factbook, 2014) reports that over the past
1Please note that CAIT data are derived from several sources. Full citations are available
at http://cait2.wri.org/faq.html#q07. FAOSTAT Emissions database, http://faostat3.fao.org/faostat-
gateway/go/to/browse/G2/*/E.
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Table 1: Data Sources of Pollutants and their unit of measurement
Variable Source Unit of Measurement
CH4(Methane) CAIT (2015) Gg in CO2 equiv. per capita
HFCs/PFCs/SF6 UNFCCC (2015) Tg in CO2 equiv. per capita
NH3(Ammonia) NEC/NFR (2015) Gg per capita
NO2 (Nitrogen Dioxide) UNFCCC (2015) Gg per capita
NOx (Nitric Oxide) NEC/NFR (2015) Gg per capita
SF6 (Sulfur Hexafluoride) UNFCCC (2015) Gg in CO2 equiv. per capita
SO2 (Sulfur Dioxide) Stern (2006) Kg per capita
SOx (Sulfur Oxide) EEA (2015) Gg per capita
Municipal Waste Eurostat (2015) Kg per capita
25 years, we have seen a decline in all the above air pollutant emissions, due to several
reasons, such as: a switch to more non-fossil fuel energy sources, energy conservation
technological improvements, and stronger environmental regulations. However, this im-
provement in OECD countries has been offset in other parts of the world, where growth
has resulted in increased fossil fuel use.
Municipal solid waste, or simply municipal waste is denoted by MW throughout our
paper. (USEPA, 2016) defines municipal waste as the waste collected and treated by or for
municipalities. It covers waste mainly from appliances, batteries, bottles, cans, clothing,
food scraps, furniture, grass clippings, product packaging, newspapers paint and plas-
tic materials. All these trashes are mainly generated from households, houses, hospitals,
schools, government enterprises and private businesses. (USEPA, 2016) claims that “In
2012, Americans generated about 251 million tons of trash and recycled and composted al-
most 87 million tons of this material, equivalent to a 34.5 percent recycling rate. On average,
Americans recycled and composted 1.51 pounds of their individual waste generation of 4.38
pounds per person per day... In 2012, newspaper/mechanical papers recovery was about 70
percent (5.9 million tons), and about 58 percent of yard trimmings were recovered. Organic
materials continue to be the largest component of MW. Paper and paperboard account for 28
percent and yard trimmings and food waste account for another 28 percent. Plastics comprise
about 13 percent; metals make up 9 percent; and rubber, leather, and textiles account for 8
percent. Wood follows at around 6 percent and glass at 5 percent. Other miscellaneous wastes
make up approximately 3 percent of the MW generated in 2011. . . Recycling and composting
prevented 86.6 million tons of material away from being disposed in 2012, up from 15 million
tons in 1980. This prevented the release of approximately 168 million metric tons of carbon
dioxide equivalent into the air in 2012—equivalent to taking over 33 million cars off the road
for a year.” We obtain the data of municipal waste from (EUROSTAT, 2015). We use Kg of
6
municipal waste generated per capita as a unit of measurement for this pollutant.
We denote sulfur hexafluoride with SF6. We obtain per capita emissions of SF6 from
(UNFCCC, 2015). They are in Gg in CO2 equivalent per capita emissions. According to
(IPPC, 2007), SF6 is evaluated as the most potent gas out of all GHGs. It is used mainly by
electronics manufacturers and electrical utilities and in the industry of magnesium produc-
tion. Pound per pound, the comparative impact of SF6 on climate change is approximately
2300 times greater than CO2 over a 100 years period. SF6 is extremely long-lived in the
atmosphere. However, according to (IPPC, 2007) despite being the most potent GHGs its
contribution to global warming is estimated to be less than .02 percent. This is due to the
fact of its very low releases in the atmosphere as compared to those of CO2. According to
(USEPA, 2016), emissions of SF6 in the U.S. have declined during the 1990 to 2013 time
period, due to reduction efforts in the electricity transmission and distribution industry. In
the U.S., emissions of SF6 are expected to decline by 25% between 2005 to 2020.
We denote ammonia, or azane, or as known in chemistry, nitrogen trifluoride with NH3.
We obtain per capita emissions of NH3 from (NECNFR, 2015). They are in Gg per capita
emissions. NH3 is a gas that is mainly released into the atmosphere from the decay process
of nitrogenous animal and vegetable matter.
We denote hydrofluorocarbons with HFCs and perfluorocarbons with PFCs. Both these
GHGs together with SF6 and nitrogen trifluoride (NH3) are called fluorinated gases, or
simply F-Gases. (USEPA, 2016) states that “unlike many other greenhouse gases, fluori-
nated gases have no natural sources and only come from human-related activities. They are
emitted through a variety of industrial processes such as aluminum and semiconductor manu-
facturing. Many fluorinated gases have very high global warming potentials relative to other
greenhouse gases, so small atmospheric concentrations can have large effects on global tem-
peratures. They can also have long atmospheric lifetimes, in some cases, lasting thousands
of years. Like other long-lived greenhouse gases, fluorinated gases are well-mixed in the at-
mosphere, spreading around the world after they are emitted. Fluorinated gases are removed
from the atmosphere only when they are destroyed by sunlight in the far upper atmosphere.
In general, fluorinated gases are the most potent and longest lasting type of greenhouse gases
emitted by human activities.” According to (USEPA, 2016), HFCs are used as refrigerants
aerosol propellants, solvents, and fire retardants. The major emissions source of these
compounds is their use as refrigerants, or in air conditioning systems in both vehicles and
buildings. PFCs are compounds produced as a byproduct of various industrial processes
associated with aluminum production and the manufacturing of semiconductors. In the
U.S., between 1990 and 2015, emissions of HFCs have increased by 250% because they
have been widely used as a substitute for ozone-depleting substances. However, during
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the same time period, emissions of PFCs have declined due to emission reduction efforts
in the aluminum production industry. We have aggregate data for per capita emissions of
HFCs, PFCs and SF6 but not for NH3. We obtain them from (UNFCCC, 2015) and they are
in Tg in CO2 equivalent per capita emissions. In Table 2 we provide a statistical descrip-
tion of these variables along with their results of a unit root (Im-Pesharan-Shin) test. Note
that the data for all our variables are over the 1989-2013 time period, for 28 EU members
and the U.S. All the other variables are explained in (Qirjo and Pascalau, 2019). See also
(Pascalau and Qirjo, 2017a) for details on filling out the missing observations using the
Amelia 2 program in R. Moreover, see the former paper for the presentation and economic
interpretation of three econometric models (M1, M2, & M3) that we use in this paper.
3 Empirical Results
We apply exactly the same empirical methodology as in (Qirjo and Pascalau, 2019). The
effects of TTIP on HFCs/PFCs/SF6, CH4, SO2, MW, SOx, NO2, NOx, SF6, NH3 per capita
emissions and municipal waste per capita are reported in Tables 3 through 11, respectively.
Analogously to (Qirjo and Pascalau, 2019), each Table, in this section, reports the estima-
tion results using fixed effects for M1, M2 & M3 in the first, second and third columns
respectively and the estimation results of the same models, using random effects are re-
ported in the fourth, fifth, and sixth columns, respectively. Further, the estimation results
of the three models, using cross-sectional fixed effects are reported in the seventh, eighth
and ninth columns, respectively, while the estimation results of the same models, using
serial-correlation fixed effects are reported in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth columns,
respectively.
Scale-Technique Effects and EKC: In all columns of Tables 3 through 11, we report the
scale-technique effects. The 6throw indicates the proxy of the scale-technique effect as
measured by one period lagged three-year moving average of income per capita. In the
7th row, we report its squared value in order to investigate the empirical validity of the
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). In the case of NOx, we provide statistically signifi-
cant evidence for most of our models and estimation methods, consistent with the EKC
argument, which indicates that for low income per capita values, there is exist a positive
relationship between per capita income and per capita emissions of NOx, but for high in-
come per capita values, there is a negative relationship between the latter two variables.
In other words, initially for low levels of income per capita the scale effect dominates the
technique effect, but then eventually for high levels of income per capita their role is in-
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verted.2 However, in the case of NO2 and NH3, we find moderately statistically significant
evidence of a positive and monotonic relationship between growth and per capita emis-
sions of each of the latter two air pollutants, respectively. This implies that for both these
air pollutants, the scale effect dominates the technique effect. On the other hand, for SO2
and SOx, we find statistically significant evidence of a negative and monotonic relationship
between income per capita and emissions per capita of each of the latter two air pollutants,
respectively. Thus, for both these air pollutants, the technique effect dominates the scale
effect. Note that the empirical validity of the EKC is analyzed further in (Pascalau and
Qirjo, 2017b), who employ the same dataset with the current study, but they also con-
trol for the cube of income per capita variable, and political economic variables such the
GINI coefficient, corruption measures, rule of law, contract enforcement, etc... They report
empirical evidence in support of EKC for HFCs/PFCs/SF6, CH4, and CO2, but they find a
positive and monotonic relationship between per capita income and per capita emissions
of GHGs, SF6, and NO2, respectively. The also find an U-shaped relationship between per
capita income and per capita emissions of SO2, and SOx, respectively. 3
Composition Effects: We report the direct composition effect of growth, as measured
by the capital-labor ratio, and the composition effect of growth, as measured by the cross
product of income per capita and capital-labor ratio, in the 8th and 10th rows respectively
in each of the Tables 3 through 11 for all our models. We also include the square of the
capital-labor ratio, in the 9th row of our tables, in order to capture the diminishing effect
of capital accumulation at the margin. We find that the accumulation of capital increases
per capita emissions of CH4, NOx, and SF6, respectively. We also find a positive and statis-
tically significant relationship between the composition of growth and per capita emissions
of SO2. However, we show a negative and statistically significant evidence between the
composition of growth and per capita emissions of NO2 and NH3, respectively.
Population Density Effects: We report the relationship between an inverse measurement
of population density, as proxied by land per capita, and pollution in the 14th row, only for
M2 & M3 under each estimation method in Tables 3-11. We also include its squared value
in the 15th row in order to capture its diminishing returns. We provide positive (negative)
2Moreover, we also find moderately statistically significant evidence of the EKC for HFCs/PFCs/SF6(per
capita income is positive and statistically significant and the square of income per capita is negative but not
statistically significant for almost every empirical specification or model we use in the study) and SF6 (per
capita income is almost always positive and statistically significant, but the squared income per capita is
negative and statistically significant only when using M3 under serial correlation fixed effects with Driscoll-
Kraay robust standard errors).
3In addition, using the same empirical specifications and models, but a dataset that contains the 28 EU
members and Canada during the 1990-2016 time period, Qirjo et al. (2019a) and Qirjo et al. (2019b),
among other things, investigate the existence of the EKC and find no evidence in its support for per capita
emissions of GHGs and CO2.
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and statistically significant evidence of population density (land per capita) and per capita
emissions of MW, SOx, CH4, and NOx. However, inconsistent with the environmental
economics literature, we find statistically significant evidence that population density (land
per capita) reduces (increases) per capita pollution of HFCs/PFCs/SF6, SF6 , and NO2. For
the latter air pollutant, this relationship is statistically significant only when employing
fixed effects method with cross-sectional dependence robust standard errors.
FDI Effects: We show the effects of FDI (over the stock of capital) on pollution in the
13th row when using M2 & M3 for each estimation method in Tables 3 through 11. We re-
port a statistically significant and positive relationship between the FDI measurement and
the per capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 (even thought is moderately statistically signifi-
cant). This follows the classical pollution haven argument which claims that multinational
corporations locate their production in countries that have lax environmental regulations
and policies. However, we also report a statistically significant and negative relationship
between the FDI variable and the per capita emissions of SO2, SF6, and SOx, respectively.
This negative relationship is consistent with the technique effect of FDI which argues that
multinational corporations spread out their environmentally cleaner production methods
for quality control, or engineering from their countries of origin. Consequently, in this case
multinationals may help reduce per capita emissions of the latter three air pollutants.
FEH: We use the cross-product of trade intensity and relative capital to labor ratio to
capture the FEH. This is denoted by T(RKL) and it is reported in the 2nd row of Tables 3
through 11. We present the squared term of the cross-product of trade and relative capi-
tal to labor ratio (in order to measure its diminishing returns) in the 3rd row of Tables 3
through 11. Keep in mind that, since we are investigating the possible role of the imple-
mentation of TTIP on environment, the relative capital-labor ratios are expressed relative
to the U.S., and trade intensity is expressed as the ratio of the volume of bilateral trade
of each EU member and the U.S. divided by national GDP (in the case of the U.S., it is its
total of exports and imports with all the EU members divided by the GDP of the U.S.). FEH
suggests that the implementation of TTIP would increase pollution in capital-abundant
countries, but decrease it in labor-abundant countries. Following the literature on trade
and environment, capital-intensive goods are considered pollution-intensive goods, while
labor-intensive goods are considered environmental friendly goods. Hence, following the
classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory, a further trade openness between the capital-abundant
U.S. and a typical labor-abundant EU member would increase the production of capital-
intensive goods in the U.S. and the labor-intensive ones in an average EU member. Note
that there are only 3 EU members that have higher capital to labor ratio as compared to the
U.S. (these are Austria, Italy, and Luxembourg), while all the other EU members have lower
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capital to labor ratio relative to the U.S. Thus, higher trade intensity between the U.S. and
a typical EU could lead to higher pollution in the U.S., but lower pollution in an average
EU member. In our sample, on average, focusing on the signs of T(RKL) and T(RKL)2,
we find statistically significant evidence consistent with the FEH for HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and
NO2, respectively. Moreover, we find statistically significant evidence implying a convex
relationship between relative to the U.S. capital to labor ration and per capita emissions of
SOx, NH3and NOx, respectively.
PHH1 & PHH2: We employ the cross-product of trade intensity and relative income per
capita to capture PHH1. This is denoted by T(RI) and it is reported in the 4th row of Tables
3 through 11. We report its squared value in the 5th row in order to capture its diminishing
returns. Keep in mind that income per capita is measured as the three-year lagged moving
average of real GDP (Iit = .6 ∗ Iit−1+ .3 ∗ Iit−2+ .1 ∗ Iit−3). Also, since we are investigating
the possible role of the implementation of TTIP on environment, the relative income per
capita of each country is expressed relative to the U.S. PHH1 claims that the environmental
friendly goods are luxury goods. In this sense poor countries are encouraged to adopt lax
environmental regulation and policies, and therefore, produce mainly pollution-intensive
goods. Analogously, rich countries adopt stringent environmental regulation and policies
that force them to produce environmentally cleaner goods. In our sample, there are only 3
EU members that are richer than the U.S. (these are Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden),
while all the other EU members are poorer than the U.S. Therefore, following PHH1, more
trade openness between the U.S. and the EU should decrease pollution in the U.S., but
increase it in a typical EU member. On average, we find generally statistically significant
evidence in support of the PHH1 for SOx, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, NO2, SF6, and NH3. In other
words, on average, per capita emissions of the latter 5 air pollutants go down as countries
get richer due to the implementation of TTIP.
We also use an alternative method to test the existence of the PHH2 due to the im-
plementation of TTIP. More specifically, we use the cross-product of trade intensity and
relative land per capita to detect PHH2. This is denoted by T(RLPC) and it is reported in
the 11th row of Tables 3 through 11. We report its squared value in the 12th row in order
to measure its diminishing returns. Again, the relative land per capita of each country is
expressed relative to the U.S. Consistent with PHH2 argument, the implementation of TTIP
may move the production of pollution-intensive goods from densely populated countries
towards sparsely populated ones. In our sample, there are only 2 EU members that are
more sparsely populated than the U.S. (these are Finland and Sweden). All the other EU
members are more densely populated than the U.S. Thus, the less densely populated U.S.
may act as pollution haven due to the implementation of TTIP. We find generally statisti-
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cally significant evidence in accordance to PHH2 for HFCs/PFCs/SF6, NO2, CH4, SF6, and
NH3. In other words, there is a positive concave relationship between relative land per
capita and emissions per capita of each of the latter 5 air pollutants, respectively. Further-
more, for SO2, we find statistically significant evidence suggesting a convex relationship
between relative to the U.S. land per capita and emissions per capita of each of SO2.
Race to the bottom or race to the top hypothesis: What could be the overall effects of
TTIP on the environment? In order to capture the possible impact of TTIP on pollution,
we employ the trade intensity term, T (the sum of bilateral exports and imports between
each EU member and the U.S. over GDP) and report it in the 1st row of Tables 3 through
11. We find strongly statistically significant evidence suggesting the existence of the race
to the top argument due to the implementation of TTIP for HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and NO2 (al-
though for HFCs/PFCs/SF6 it is statistically significant only when using M2 & M3 under
fixed and random effects or using M2 & M3 under fixed effects with cross-sectional depen-
dent robust standard errors. For NO2 it is significant, at 10% level of significance, only
when employing M1 under fixed effects and when using M3 under random effects or fixed
specification with cross-sectional dependent robust standard errors). This an important
positive result of this study, since it shows that the implementation of TTIP may be ben-
eficial to the environment because it may help reduce per capita pollution emissions of
HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and NO2. Taking a closer look at Tables 3 and 4, we observe that in a
typical TTIP member the implementation of TTIP could help reduce per capita emissions
of NO2, and HFCs/PFCs/SF6 because PHH1 is dominated by FEH and PHH2. In simple
words, more openness to trade between the U.S. and the EU could help reduce per capita
emissions of the latter 2 air pollutants because being labor-abundant and densely popu-
lated typical EU member appears to be more environmentally efficient despite the fact of
being poorer than the U.S.
However, there are also some potentially bad news in regards to the effects of the im-
plementation of TTIP on the environment. We find some statistically significant evidence
consistent with the race to the bottom hypothesis. In particular, we find that the imple-
mentation of TTIP may help increase per capita emissions of SO2 (generally statistically
significant under each of our models and empirical specifications with the exception of the
serial correlation fixed effects with Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors), SOx (statistically
significant only when using M1 & M2 under fixed or random effects and fixed method with
cross-sectional dependent robust standard error), NOx (statistically significant only when
using M1 & M2 under fixed or random effects and when employing each of our three mod-
els under fixed specification with cross-sectional dependent robust standard error), SF6
(statistically significant only when using M1 & M2 under each of the 4 of our estimation
12
methods), and NH3 (statistically significant only when using M1 & M2 under fixed or ran-
dom effects and fixed method with cross-sectional dependent robust standard error and
when employing M2 under the serial correlation fixed effects with Driscoll-Kraay robust
standard errors). Focusing on the signs and statistically significance of the coefficients as-
sociated to FEH, PHH1, & PHH2, it appears that for SO2, the implementation of TTIP could
help increase per capita emissions of SO2 because PHH1 dominates FEH & PHH2. Put it
differently, the implementation of TTIP could help increase per capita emissions of SO2
because being a poor EU member is more important (in terms of environmental policies
associated to SO2) than being labor-abundant and densely populated EU member as com-
pared to the U.S. In the case of SOx and NOx, it turns out that more trade intensity between
the U.S. and the EU may help increase per capita emissions of SOx and NOx because FEH
dominates PHH1. In other words, the implementation of TTIP may help increase per capita
emissions of SOx and NOx because being a capital-abundant EU member (or the U.S. being
more capital abundant that an average EU member) is more important for emissions per
capita of SOx and NOx than being a rich EU member relative to the U.S. (or the U.S. being
richer than an average EU member). In the case of SF6 and NH3, it appears that there is a
positive and statistically significant evidence between the trade intensity variable and per
capita emissions of SF6 and NH3. This result stands because PHH2 dominates PHH1. In
simple words, the implementation of TTIP may help increase per capita emissions of SF6
and NH3, because the U.S. may act as pollution haven due to being sparsely populated
despite the fact that it is richer than a typical EU member.
Further Globalization Effects: Bilateral trade between the U.S. and a subset of EU mem-
bers in the sample could be influenced by geographical, cultural, or political reasons. In
particular, some TTIP members use English as an official language, or they have access to
sea or ocean, or they officially adopt the same currency. In order to capture these effects,
as described in (Qirjo and Pascalau, 2019), we employ three dummy variables. In the first
one, we use the cross-product of the trade intensity variable with a dummy that is 1 if the
official language is English (English=1) and o otherwise. This is denoted by English=1 x
Trade and it is reported in the 16th row. In the second one, we employ the cross-product of
trade with the Sea dummy that is 1 if the TTIP member has access to the sea or the ocean
(Sea=1) and o otherwise. This is denoted by Sea=1 x Trade and it is reported in the 17th
row. Finally, for the third dummy variable, we use the cross-product of the trade intensity
variable with the Euro dummy, where an EU member get a value of 1 for the years that
have adopted Euro as their official language (Euro=1) and 0 otherwise. This is denoted
by Euro=1 x Trade and it is reported in the 18th row of Tables 3 through 11.
We find statistically significant evidence, implying that the implementation of TTIP in
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countries that use English as an official language may help increase per capita emissions
of NO2, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, CH4, SF6, SO2, and NH3 relative to countries where English is not
an official language. Remember that for the first two air pollutants, we find a negative re-
lationship between the trade intensity variable and their per capita emissions, respectively.
Thus, the latter result combine with the result of this dummy variable implies that per
capita emissions of NO2 and HFCs/PFCs/SF6 would be reduced less in TTIP members that
use English as their official language (the U.S., the UK, Malta and Ireland) as compared
to the EU members that do not use English as their official language due to the imple-
mentation of TTIP. This could be because, on average, per capita emissions of the latter
2 air pollutants maybe reduced more in the former Ex-Communist members of the EU
which could be producing more labor-intensive goods due to higher trade intensity with
the U.S. We find that there is a positive relationship between the trade intensity variable
and per capita emissions of SF6, SO2, and NH3, respectively. Therefore, the possible im-
plementation of TTIP may help increase per capita emissions of the latter 3 air pollutants,
respectively. The interpretation of the latter two results could be related to the fact that
there is more trade due to language similarities between the U.S. and each of the English
speaking EU members (the U.K., Ireland, and Malta) respectively, as compared to trade
between the U.S. and each of the other EU members.
The results show that the implementation of TTIP in countries that have sea or ocean
access may help reduce per capita emissions of CH4, SO2, SF6, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, and NO2
relative to countries that are landlocked. This could suggest that for the latter two air
pollutants, their emissions per capita, as a consequence of TTIP, could be reduced more
in countries that have sea access because they trade more with the U.S. as compared to
landlocked EU members due to shipping costs differences. However, the implementation
of TTIP in countries that have sea access may help increase per capita emissions of SOx
and NOx as compared to landlocked countries. Analogous to HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and NO2,
per capita emissions of SOx and NOx could be increased more in countries that have sea
access because they trade more with the U.S. as compared to landlocked EU members as
a result of the implementation of TTIP. On the other hand, in a counter-intuitive manner,
the implementation of TTIP in countries that have sea access may help reduce per capita
emissions of CH4, SO2, and SF6 relative to countries that are landlocked, despite the fact
that we report a positive relationship between the trade intensity variable and per capita
emissions of each of the latter 3 air pollutants.
We report statistically significant evidence indicating that the implementation of TTIP
in countries that have adopted Euro as their official currency may help increase more per
capita emissions of SOx as compared to TTIP members, where Euro is not an official cur-
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rency. This result may imply that due to the implementation of TTIP, per capita emissions
of SOx could be increased more in EU members that have adopted Euro since they trade
more as a group with the U.S. due to lower exchange transaction’s costs as compared to
the other part of the EU members that have not adopted Euro as their official currency.
We find statistically significant evidence suggesting that more trade openness between the
EU members that have adopted Euro as their official currency and the U.S. would increase
per capita emissions of SF6 and NH3 less as compared to the EU members that have not
adopted Euro as their official currency. Note that for most of the years in our sample, in
general, EU members that have adopted Euro as their official currency are at higher de-
velopment stages as compared to EU members that have not adopted Euro as their official
currency (however, a notable exception of this claim is the UK). Therefore, despite the fact
that the EU members that have adopted Euro as their official currency may trade more
with the U.S. due to lower exchange transaction’s costs, they may benefit from stronger
technique effects (adaptation of environmental friendly technologies as a result of higher
trade intensity) because of trading more with the U.S., which is in a similar stage of eco-
nomic development. We show robust evidence implying that the implementation of TTIP
in EU members that have adopted Euro as their official currency may help reduce more per
capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and NO2 as compared to TTIP members where Euro
is not an official currency. This result may stand because EU members that have adopted
Euro could be trading more as a group with the U.S. due to lower exchange transaction’s
costs relative to the EU members that have not adopted Euro as their official currency. And
more trade between the former EU members and the U.S. is associated with lower per
capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and NO2, respectively.
In the rest of the Tables, similar to (Qirjo and Pascalau, 2019), we use two different
instrumental approaches for robustness purposes. In particular, in Tables 12 through 20,
we provide evidence of the robustness of our result for all our pollutants by employing
the lag of trade as an instrumental variable for the contemporaneous variable of trade.
Furthermore, in Tables 21 through 29 we provide another robustness check for our 8 air
pollutants and municipal waste using an instrumental approach based on the gravity model
similar to (Frankel and Rose, 2005). For more details on each of these two instrumental
variable approaches see Qirjo and Pascalau (2019). The results of Tables 12-20 and 21-29,
generally resemble those of Tables 3-11, respectively.
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4 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the impact of the possible implementation of a TTIP on 8 air pollu-
tants SO2, SOx, CH4, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, NO2, NOx, SF6, NH3, and municipal waste, respec-
tively. We employ the same econometric techniques, models, and explanatory variables as
in Qirjo and Pascalau (2019). We use a panel dataset for 28 EU members and the U.S.,
over the 1989-2013 time period. We find that trade liberalization could assist in the fight
against global warming because it may help reduce per capita emissions of two air pollu-
tants in a typical TTIP member. More specifically, keeping everything else constant, we find
consistently statistically significant evidence implying that one percent increase in bilateral
trade between the U.S. and a typical EU member may help reduce per capita emissions of
HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and NO2 by about 3 Tg in CO2 in-equivalent and 10 Gg, respectively. On
the other hand, we also provide generally statistically significant evidence implying that
trade liberalization could also denigrate the environment. This is related to our finding
that suggest that the possible implementation of TTIP, on average, may help increase per
capita emissions of five air pollutants. In particular, holding everything else constant, we
report generally statistically significant evidence suggesting that one percent increase in
bilateral trade between the U.S. and a typical EU member may help increase per capita
emissions of SO2, SOx, NOx, SF6, and NH3 by about 360 Kg, 446 Gg, 528 Gg, 750 Gg in
CO2 in-equivalent, and 45 Gg, respectively.
Focusing on the average TTIP member, we provide statistically significant evidence
consistent with PHH1 due to the implementation of TTIP, for SOx, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, NO2,
SF6, and NH3. Put it differently, on average, per capita emissions of these five air pollutants
decrease as poor EU members get richer relative to the U.S. due to the implementation of
TTIP. Furthermore, we find statistically significant evidence consistent with PHH2 due to
the implementation of TTIP, for HFCs/PFCs/SF6, NO2, CH4, SF6, and NH3. In other words,
the U.S. may act as pollution haven according to PHH2 for the latter five air pollutants as
a consequence of the implementation of TTIP. Moreover, we report statistically significant
evidence consistent with FEH due to the implementation of TTIP for HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and
NO2. Thus, for these two air pollutants, the implementation of TTIP may help reduce air
pollution in labor-abundant EU members and increase it in capital-abundant ones.
Since a typical EU member is a poorer, more labor-abundant, and more densely popu-
lated country as compared to the U.S., we cannot predict theoretically in an unambiguous
way the effects of the implementation of TTIP on the environment. We provide statistically
significant evidence suggesting that in the cases of NO2 and HFCs/PFCs/ SF6, trade open-
ness between the U.S. and the EU could be beneficial to the environment because FEH
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and PHH2 dominates PHH1. At the same time, we report statistically significant evidence
implying that the implementation of TTIP could denigrate the environment because PHH1
dominates FEH & PHH2 for SO2 , and/or FEH dominates PHH1 for SOx and NOx, and/or
PHH2 dominates PHH1 for SF6 and NH3.
We find generally statistically significant evidence implying that the implementation of
TTIP in countries that have access to sea may help reduce per capita emissions of CH4, SO2,
SF6, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, and NO2 more than in countries that are landlocked. However, the
opposite is true for SOx and NOx. Moreover, we report statistically significant evidence,
indicating that the implementation of TTIP in countries that use Euro as their common
currency may help reduce per capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and NO2 more than
in countries where Euro is not their official currency. However, the opposite is true for
SOx. Further, more trade openness between the EU members that have adopted Euro as
their official currency and the U.S. would increase per capita emissions of SF6 and NH3
less relative to the EU members that have not adopted Euro as their official currency. In
addition, we provide statistically significant evidence, indicating that the implementation
of TTIP in countries that use English as their official language may help increase per capita
emissions of NO2, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, CH4, SF6, SO2, and NH3 as compared to countries
where English is not one of their official languages.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics and Unit Root Tests
Variable Dimension N Mean SD Min Max Unit Root Tests
SO2 Level 725 20.838 18.599 0.178 121.245 2.018
Municipal Waste Level 725 473.323 132.485 159.814 800.636 -7.568***
SOx Level 725 35.221 33.692 0.886 267.715 -2.410***
CH4 Level 725 1.128 0.576 0.456 3.972 0.196
HFC/PFC/SF6 Level 725 0.134 0.126 0.000 0.900 -1.930**
NO2 Level 725 2.804 1.412 0.085 8.936 -6.496***
NOx Level 725 38.481 39.928 7.247 308.537 -4.330***
SF6 Level 725 13.304 25.830 0.000 220.686 -2.695***
NH3 Level 725 9.807 5.223 3.459 32.799 -6.225***
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. For all series,
with the exception of the "relative" series, we use the Z-t-tilde-bar statistic of the Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root
test where the AR parameter is panel specific. In all cases, we also include a time trend. For the "relative"
series, we compute the Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test since the Im-Pesaran-Shin test did not meet the required
assumptions. The null states that all panels contain unit roots, while the alternative states that some panels
are stationary.
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Table 3: Dependent Variable (Y) - HFC/PFC/SF6 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade –.394 –1.917* –4.580*** –1.220 –1.800* –4.217*** –.394 –1.917** –4.580*** –.344 –.230 –.495
Trade × RKL –.631 3.132 7.632*** .877 2.445 3.211 –.631 3.132* 7.632*** –.925 –.806 1.287
Trade × (RKL)2 –.771 –2.479** –4.335*** –1.772 –2.343** –2.449** –.771 –2.479** –4.335*** .436 .299 –.599
Trade × RI –2.886* –5.076*** –3.618* –.766 –2.975 .172 –2.886* –5.076** –3.618 .676 .140 –.709
Trade × (RI)2 1.767** 2.905*** 2.475** .805 1.827* .678 1.767** 2.905** 2.475** –.358 .064 .327
I .006** .008*** .008*** .007*** .008*** .006** .006*** .008*** .008*** .001 .001 .002
I2 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000* –.000** –.000**
KL .000 .000 –.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 –.000 .000 .000 .000
(KL)2 .000 .000 .000 –.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000* –.000 –.000 –.000
KL × I –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 .000* .000** .000**
Trade × RLPC 1.493 6.573*** 2.756* 3.437** 1.493 6.573*** –.470 .793
Trade × (RLPC)2 .911 –1.604 –.930 –1.041 .911 –1.604* .438 .126
FDI/K .119** .163*** .025 .036 .119*** .163*** .033 .044
LPC 4.775*** 4.656*** –.203 –.221 4.775*** 4.656*** –.069 .344
(LPC)2 –.250*** –.243*** .008 .009 –.250*** –.243*** .009 –.012
English=1 × Trade 4.246*** 2.784*** 4.246*** 1.262***
Sea=1 × Trade –3.820*** –1.286 –3.820*** –1.774**
Euro=1 × Trade –.236 –.535** –.236 .249
Y(t-1) .882*** .886*** .851***
Constant .054 –22.581*** –22.004*** .015 1.180 1.348 .045 –22.796*** –22.293*** –.012 –.113 –2.230
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3),
respectively. Cross represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression




Table 4: Dependent Variable (Y) - NO2 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 9.225* –2.024 –9.363 7.146 –5.408 –11.450* 9.225 –2.024 –9.363* 3.709 1.134 –.027
Trade × RKL –5.079 20.195* 36.252*** –4.969 27.043** 36.347*** –5.079 20.195* 36.252*** .421 7.443 10.228**
Trade × (RKL)2 4.038 –13.353** –20.920*** 4.005 –12.268* –18.135*** 4.038 –13.353** –20.920*** 1.423 –3.283 –5.332*
Trade × RI –16.861* –37.319*** –25.530** –7.184 –38.552*** –15.885 –16.861 –37.319*** –25.530** –16.085*** –23.304*** –15.143***
Trade × (RI)2 –6.540 9.126* 4.928 –11.558** 5.057 –2.620 –6.540 9.126 4.928 4.669** 9.052*** 6.021**
I .009 .016 .012 .018 .041*** .027** .009 .016 .012 .008 .012* .008
I2 .001*** .001** .001*** .001*** .001** .001*** .001*** .001** .001*** .000 .000 .000
KL .001 –.001 –.002 .001 –.002 –.002 .001 –.001 –.002 .000 –.000 –.000
(KL)2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000* –.000 –.000 .000
KL × I –.000*** –.000** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000 –.000 –.000
Trade × RLPC 47.146*** 63.621*** 63.819*** 73.918*** 47.146*** 63.621*** 13.582*** 17.145***
Trade × (RLPC)2 –22.111*** –30.627*** –32.712*** –38.904*** –22.111*** –30.627*** –5.968 –8.422**
FDI/K –.316 –.112 –.119 .089 –.316 –.112 –.048 .030
LPC 7.069 6.637 –1.661 –2.277 7.069** 6.637** .143 –.237
(LPC)2 –.181 –.161 .127 .161 –.181 –.161 .044 .061
English=1 × Trade 14.014*** 11.083*** 14.014*** 2.322*
Sea=1 × Trade –15.937*** –13.397*** –15.937*** –3.967
Euro=1 × Trade –2.117 –4.632*** –2.117 –1.753***
Y(t-1) .874*** .823*** .809***
Constant 3.027*** –46.561* –44.214* 2.789*** 7.049 9.984 3.032*** –46.920*** –44.889*** .167 –4.767 –2.760
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .445 .564 .594 .925 .941 .945 .984 .985 .985
R2 adj. .387 .514 .545
BIC 691.157 576.221 552.006 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross
represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the
dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient.
Table 5: Dependent Variable (Y) - CH4 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 1.022 2.369 –1.209 .169 –3.148* –8.936*** 1.022 2.369 –1.209 140.428 2.137 –1.359
Trade × RKL –2.847 –3.352 2.145 –2.267 7.504* 13.593*** –2.847 –3.352 2.145 –64.843 –3.136 2.453
Trade × (RKL)2 1.337 .535 –2.145 .947 –3.851* –6.814*** 1.337 .535 –2.145 –560.773 .505 –2.254
Trade × RI 1.442 –3.430 2.796 4.726* –5.320 4.230 1.442 –3.430 2.796 672.797 –3.455 3.160
Trade × (RI)2 –4.609*** –.952 –3.044* –6.089*** –.537 –3.670* –4.609* –.952 –3.044 –164.974 –.972 –3.234
I –.005 –.003 –.006 –.004 .004 –.002 –.005 –.003 –.006 –.415 –.003 –.006
I2 .000* .000 .000 .000* –.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .054*** .000 .000
KL .002** .002** .002** .002* .001 .001 .002*** .002*** .002** .054 .002*** .002**
(KL)2 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 .001 –.000 –.000
KL × I –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.013** –.000 –.000
Trade × RLPC 1.882 8.701*** 15.669*** 23.877*** 1.882 8.701*** 2.124 8.908***
Trade × (RLPC)2 1.192 –2.672 –7.245*** –12.088*** 1.192 –2.672 1.169 –2.662
FDI/K –.044 .044 .160* .276*** –.044 .044 –.038 .056
LPC –8.038*** –8.549*** –1.399** –1.005* –8.038*** –8.549*** –7.680*** –8.068***
(LPC)2 .468*** .492*** .088** .063** .468*** .492*** .449*** .467***
English=1 × Trade 5.450*** 6.299*** 5.450*** 5.380***
Sea=1 × Trade –5.476*** –5.222*** –5.476*** –5.649***
Euro=1 × Trade –1.284*** –1.973*** –1.284** –1.357**
Y(t-1) .603*** .000 .001**
Constant 1.198*** 35.151*** 37.848*** 1.177*** 6.464** 5.039** .897*** 35.214*** 37.830*** 241.176*** 33.465*** 35.490***
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .436 .536 .591 .957 .965 .969 .912 .965 .969
R2 adj. .376 .483 .541
BIC –734.007 –821.397 –877.915 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
Cross represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag
of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient.
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Table 6: Dependent Variable (Y) - SO2 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 190.074* 586.499*** 298.228** 201.739* 379.583*** 213.149 190.074 586.499*** 298.228** 9.620 47.869 –6.668
Trade × RKL –103.619 –1071.608*** –871.338*** –142.476 –631.664*** –365.190 –103.619 –1071.608*** –871.338*** 55.427 –44.157 –68.644
Trade × (RKL)2 –96.864 406.151*** 366.983*** –75.629 156.779 92.434 –96.864 406.151*** 366.983*** –29.196 18.043 34.459
Trade × RI –113.391 527.049*** 376.065 –77.878 382.599* 182.289 –113.391 527.049*** 376.065** –57.467 19.394 36.452
Trade × (RI)2 227.477** –170.917 –90.117 180.565* –55.791 8.532 227.477*** –170.917** –90.117 35.336 –7.316 –4.981
I –1.572*** –1.943*** –1.962*** –1.201*** –1.618*** –1.527*** –1.572*** –1.943*** –1.962*** –.039 –.110 –.159
I2 –.009* .001 .001 –.012** –.005 –.006 –.009** .001 .001 –.004*** –.003** –.003**
KL –.076 –.040 –.044 –.037 –.016 –.031 –.076* –.040 –.044 –.015 –.013 –.010
(KL)2 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000
KL × I .004*** .002* .002* .004*** .004** .004*** .004*** .002*** .002*** .001*** .001*** .001***
Trade × RLPC –1079.362*** –703.662*** –889.324*** –631.415*** –1079.362*** –703.662*** –114.548* –73.451
Trade × (RLPC)2 627.744*** 439.963*** 615.504*** 528.364*** 627.744*** 439.963*** 72.514* 40.842
FDI/K –24.413*** –23.796*** –8.848 –9.052 –24.413*** –23.796*** –3.099* –3.102*
LPC –750.567*** –775.785*** –2.748 –7.256 –750.567*** –775.785*** –50.048 –67.610
(LPC)2 37.326*** 38.724*** –.109 .082 37.326*** 38.724*** 2.478 3.342
English=1 × Trade 283.160*** 276.105*** 283.160*** 20.693
Sea=1 × Trade –53.174 –185.545* –53.174 41.529
Euro=1 × Trade 23.664 53.738* 23.664 –8.906
Y(t-1) .941*** .929*** .925***
Constant 55.519*** 3777.708*** 3893.578*** 45.629*** 85.003 113.325 60.297*** 3818.431*** 3934.792*** 3.189 255.932 346.483
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .286 .391 .418 .815 .842 .849 .977 .977 .978
R2 adj. .211 .321 .347
BIC 4342.424 4277.772 4269.294 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents
a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e.,
Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient.
Table 7: Dependent Variable (Y) - Municipal Waste Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade –420.084 256.928 479.624 –309.759 –528.030 –212.012 –420.084 256.928 479.624 140.428 488.818 364.042
Trade × RKL 295.660 –1141.339 –922.590 65.239 630.752 1362.116 295.660 –1141.339 –922.590 –64.843 –803.883 –811.341
Trade × (RKL)2 –1556.719* –642.751 –829.811 –1462.282* –1708.625* –2046.987** –1556.719* –642.751 –829.811 –560.773 –204.612 –207.432
Trade × RI 1456.209 1805.792 2390.800 1759.489 986.062 797.597 1456.209* 1805.792* 2390.800** 672.797 884.848 1100.362
Trade × (RI)2 128.277 –344.918 –597.213 –157.572 237.577 188.579 128.277 –344.918 –597.213 –164.974 –293.519 –354.977
I .413 .853 .765 2.414 3.234* 3.881** .413 .853 .765 –.415 –.469 –.632
I2 .034 .037 .039 .014 –.006 –.011 .034 .037* .039* .054*** .052*** .053***
KL .035 .022 .015 .297 .293 .260 .035 .022 .015 .054 .076 .082
(KL)2 .001 .000 .000 .000 –.000 –.000 .001 .000 .000 .001 .001 .001
KL × I –.009 –.011 –.011 –.005 –.002 –.001 –.009 –.011 –.011 –.013** –.012** –.013**
Trade × RLPC 1022.348 963.260 1792.503 1994.072* 1022.348 963.260 165.005 296.201
Trade × (RLPC)2 –1838.279* –1811.949* –1825.048** –1852.251** –1838.279* –1811.949* –716.305 –820.753
FDI/K –49.872 –44.413 24.682 23.381 –49.872 –44.413 –17.924 –16.120
LPC –3897.202*** –3866.236*** –433.879* –418.266** –3897.202*** –3866.236*** –1669.256*** –1709.739***
(LPC)2 194.543*** 192.754*** 22.865* 22.134* 194.543*** 192.754*** 85.965*** 87.877***
English=1 × Trade 12.071 260.996 12.071 71.225
Sea=1 × Trade –442.212 –851.105 –442.212 14.022
Euro=1 × Trade –96.893 115.926 –96.893 –57.040
Y(t-1) .603*** .583*** .583***
Constant 433.231*** 19680.168*** 19545.996*** 372.297*** 2403.947** 2318.402** 504.173*** 19920.814*** 19775.065*** 241.176*** 8341.354*** 8554.679***
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .293 .331 .332 .859 .867 .867 .912 .913 .913
R2 adj. .218 .254 .251
BIC 6668.342 6666.510 6685.103 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a fixed effects
regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first order
serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient.
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Table 8: Dependent Variable (Y) - SOx Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 316.860* 618.041*** 363.761 357.084** 450.223** 229.465 316.860* 618.041*** 363.761 140.428 199.774 161.330
Trade × RKL 165.902 –549.856 –728.103* 138.647 –181.649 –209.455 165.902 –549.856* –728.103** –64.843 –160.387 –310.941
Trade × (RKL)2 –278.803 60.160 248.009 –270.285 –144.017 –12.006 –278.803* 60.160 248.009 –560.773 7.260 100.068
Trade × RI –518.345* –109.905 –843.894** –595.431** –287.434 –1074.688*** –518.345** –109.905 –843.894*** 672.797 –153.362 –350.794
Trade × (RI)2 346.871** 124.814 432.842** 387.374*** 257.197 557.433*** 346.871*** 124.814 432.842*** –164.974 90.250 175.526
I –1.002** –1.332*** –1.180** –1.036*** –1.327*** –.986** –1.002** –1.332*** –1.180*** –.415 –.102 –.086
I2 –.002 .001 –.002 –.002 –.001 –.005 –.002 .001 –.002 .054*** –.005 –.005
KL .057 .088 .092 .059 .089 .086 .057 .088 .092 .054 .059 .064
(KL)2 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000* .001 –.000 –.000
KL × I .002 .002 .002 .002 .003 .003 .002 .002 .002 –.013** .002 .002
Trade × RLPC –460.113 –358.873 –239.144 –72.274 –460.113 –358.873 –23.419 –78.625
Trade × (RLPC)2 3.190 –28.864 –67.900 –110.044 3.190 –28.864 –38.412 –15.225
FDI/K –18.363* –24.642** –6.934 –11.256 –18.363*** –24.642*** –6.753 –9.216
LPC –822.446*** –845.138*** –160.330*** –158.617** –822.446*** –845.138*** –175.994 –193.241
(LPC)2 42.700*** 44.165*** 9.090*** 8.947*** 42.700*** 44.165*** 9.194 10.126
English=1 × Trade 27.751 66.751 27.751 –67.281
Sea=1 × Trade 445.471** 315.004* 445.471** 211.022**
Euro=1 × Trade 129.570*** 149.550*** 129.570*** 30.661
Y(t-1) .603*** .738*** .732***
Constant 56.858*** 3981.776*** 4068.128*** 57.355*** 759.068*** 756.120*** 38.791*** 3999.751*** 4097.072*** 241.176*** 841.298 926.568
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .546 .564 .576 .845 .851 .855 .912 .940 .940
R2 adj. .498 .514 .524
BIC 4873.635 4880.483 4883.533 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a
fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1))
to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient.
Table 9: Dependent Variable (Y) - NOx Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 509.377** 570.143** 460.278 590.502*** 487.469** 438.614 509.377** 570.143* 460.278** 11.035 165.947 25.055
Trade × RKL –1017.080** –1107.082** –1377.720*** –1215.591*** –930.287* –1000.020** –1017.080* –1107.082 –1377.720* –75.062 –379.146 –228.566
Trade × (RKL)2 498.201** 627.530** 790.043*** 634.461*** 505.274* 588.146** 498.201 627.530 790.043* 32.305 268.975 224.765
Trade × RI –243.331 –354.288 –607.140 –332.786 –572.134 –997.724** –243.331 –354.288 –607.140 –90.332 –11.281 –82.150
Trade × (RI)2 54.192 3.348 123.809 117.444 229.871 387.091 54.192 3.348 123.809 60.715 –87.203 –51.253
I 1.832*** 2.228*** 2.208*** 1.536*** 1.783*** 1.993*** 1.832*** 2.228*** 2.208*** .450* .657 .635
I2 –.025*** –.023** –.024** –.025*** –.027*** –.029*** –.025* –.023 –.024* –.018 –.014 –.015
KL .213** .180* .191* .191* .172 .171 .213** .180* .191** –.100 –.107 –.117
(KL)2 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000
KL × I .002 .001 .001 .002 .002 .003 .002 .001 .001 .004 .003 .003
Trade × RLPC 482.412 427.019 417.187 421.331 482.412 427.019 –140.149 44.579
Trade × (RLPC)2 –354.693 –347.909 –248.087 –230.804 –354.693 –347.909 89.251 5.358
FDI/K –10.238 –13.695 5.298 2.068 –10.238 –13.695 –7.098 –6.530
LPC –804.253*** –840.655*** –1.447 –.851 –804.253** –840.655** –643.417** –646.396**
(LPC)2 38.865*** 40.740*** –.171 –.219 38.865** 40.740** 30.399** 30.620**
English=1 × Trade –102.406 –47.490 –102.406 157.009
Sea=1 × Trade 377.750* 207.826 377.750* –68.295
Euro=1 × Trade 29.701 82.677 29.701 15.401
Y(t-1) .895*** .895*** .913***
Constant 2.822 4081.424*** 4256.860*** 9.797 35.646 33.577 –37.765*** 4077.414** 4263.600** 9.819 3362.505** 3372.340**
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .283 .311 .315 .867 .872 .873 .904 .908 .909
R2 adj. .208 .231 .232
BIC 5124.539 5132.921 5148.009 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a
fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1))
to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient.
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Table 10: Dependent Variable (Y) - SF6 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 1001.282*** 836.024*** –229.776 701.552*** 573.371*** 173.313 1001.282*** 836.024*** –229.776 11.035 294.092*** 41.154
Trade × RKL –1520.577*** –1282.843*** –549.923 –1051.131** –896.681* –868.066* –1520.577*** –1282.843*** –549.923* –75.062 –343.399** –165.214
Trade × (RKL)2 700.348*** 520.190** 272.557 411.382* 382.391 303.996 700.348*** 520.190*** 272.557 32.305 194.742* 182.666
Trade × RI –1891.103*** –1931.282*** –1447.853*** –1241.870*** –1561.042*** 60.431 –1891.103*** –1931.282*** –1447.853*** –90.332 –707.022*** –1116.809***
Trade × (RI)2 705.933*** 761.511*** 683.929*** 477.343*** 568.214*** –27.354 705.933*** 761.511*** 683.929*** 60.715 309.061*** 480.982***
I 2.791*** 2.846*** 2.305*** 1.983*** 2.421*** 1.112** 2.791*** 2.846*** 2.305*** .450* .357 .527*
I2 –.009 –.005 –.003 –.004 –.002 .003 –.009 –.005 –.003 –.018 –.008* –.010**
KL .239** .187* .187* .206** .127 .160 .239*** .187*** .187*** –.100 .088** .083**
(KL)2 –.001* –.000 –.000 –.001* –.000 –.000 –.001*** –.000** –.000** –.000 –.000*** –.000***
KL × I –.001 –.001 –.002 –.001 –.002 –.001 –.001 –.001 –.002 .004 .002* .002*
Trade × RLPC 268.964 1724.217*** 891.878*** 617.467** 268.964 1724.217*** 38.480 392.161**
Trade × (RLPC)2 328.606 –503.338* –206.712 –96.275 328.606** –503.338*** 75.401 –64.706
FDI/K –21.169* –11.022 –25.448** –21.324** –21.169 –11.022 10.421 8.396
LPC 407.537* 243.421 34.315 36.570 407.537*** 243.421* –.839 5.987
(LPC)2 –19.405* –11.233 –2.813 –2.901 –19.405** –11.233 .235 .170
English=1 × Trade 1060.303*** 331.216*** 1060.303*** 272.804***
Sea=1 × Trade –410.310** –253.877 –410.310*** –21.124
Euro=1 × Trade –140.367*** –244.032*** –140.367** 73.751
Y(t-1) .895*** .837*** .811***
Constant –29.973*** –2121.834** –1299.041 –18.987** –94.638 –96.106 13.493 –2093.263*** –1267.725* 9.819 –14.788 –69.025
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .282 .319 .457 .679 .695 .757 .904 .924 .927
R2 adj. .207 .240 .391
BIC 5112.060 5112.315 4993.387 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a fixed effects
regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first order
serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient.
Table 11: Dependent Variable (Y) - NH3 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 60.248*** 45.875*** 10.027 55.300*** 31.509** –13.631 60.248*** 45.875** 10.027 13.671 16.018* 8.966
Trade × RKL –90.383*** –74.379** –56.851* –90.646*** –44.463 –26.784 –90.383** –74.379* –56.851 2.142 –2.266 –2.768
Trade × (RKL)2 53.307*** 31.912* 26.573 53.299*** 27.183 19.937 53.307** 31.912 26.573 –2.998 –3.884 –5.353
Trade × RI –77.146*** –70.523*** –51.867* –50.959** –73.266*** –25.283 –77.146** –70.523* –51.867 –50.915*** –56.039*** –30.141
Trade × (RI)2 11.058 20.384 17.298 –3.124 10.605 –1.925 11.058 20.384 17.298 21.658** 26.739** 18.190
I .031 –.002 –.023 .067* .100*** .068* .031 –.002 –.023 .029 .028 .012
I2 .002*** .002** .002*** .002** .001 .001* .002** .002** .002** –.001 –.001 –.000
KL .001 –.000 –.000 .002 –.000 .001 .001 –.000 –.000 –.002 –.002 –.002
(KL)2 .000*** .000*** .000*** .000** .000** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000 –.000 .000
KL × I –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.000 .000 –.000
Trade × RLPC 43.652* 88.954*** 111.787*** 160.439*** 43.652 88.954*** 18.827 28.086
Trade × (RLPC)2 –31.446* –58.673*** –77.175*** –107.207*** –31.446* –58.673*** –14.840 –23.055**
FDI/K –1.517* –1.202 –.723 .041 –1.517 –1.202 –.616 –.414
LPC 36.599** 30.098** 4.236 3.371 36.599** 30.098* –22.952** –25.554***
(LPC)2 –1.494* –1.173 –.120 –.093 –1.494 –1.173 1.307*** 1.426***
English=1 × Trade 31.455*** 35.660*** 31.455*** 4.835
Sea=1 × Trade –6.990 –8.221 –6.990 –2.706
Euro=1 × Trade –5.695 –12.688*** –5.695 –6.231***
Y(t-1) .766*** .757*** .749***
Constant 11.692*** –196.949*** –164.181** 10.793*** –18.331 –12.458 11.074*** –199.380** –166.298** 2.636*** 103.325** 117.419***
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .646 .683 .697 .963 .967 .969 .989 .990 .990
R2 adj. .609 .646 .660
BIC 1845.838 1811.117 1802.480 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents
a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e.,
Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient.
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Table 12: Dependent Variable (Y) - HFC/PFC/SF6 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade .459 –.660 –4.246*** –.652 –1.225 –3.929*** .459 –.660 –4.246*** –.043 .300 .512
Trade × RKL –3.146 –.394 6.370*** –.849 .599 2.910 –3.146 –.394 6.370*** –1.196 –1.670 –.252
Trade × (RKL)2 .393 –.806 –3.704*** –1.087 –1.577 –2.318* .393 –.806 –3.704*** .580 .837 .179
Trade × RI –1.989 –3.706** –2.889 .169 –2.222 .156 –1.989 –3.706* –2.889 .886 .637 –.131
Trade × (RI)2 1.179 2.046** 2.060** .215 1.366 .476 1.179 2.046** 2.060** –.525 –.336 –.059
I .005** .006** .005** .006*** .007*** .005** .005*** .006*** .005** .001 .001 .001
I2 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000**
KL .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
(KL)2 –.000 .000 .000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 .000 .000 –.000 –.000 –.000
KL × I –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 .000 –.000 –.000 –.000 .000 .000 .000*
Trade × RLPC .878 7.455*** 3.203** 4.457*** .878 7.455*** –1.153 –.585
Trade × (RLPC)2 1.532 –1.768 –.847 –1.169 1.532 –1.768* 1.032 1.003
FDI/K .099* .124** .014 .022 .099** .124** .026 .033
LPC 4.356*** 4.148*** –.231 –.227 4.356*** 4.148*** –.522 –.214
(LPC)2 –.228*** –.216*** .009 .008 –.228*** –.216*** .031 .017
English=1 × trade 4.256*** 2.732*** 4.256*** .724*
Sea=1 × trade –3.814*** –1.501* –3.814*** –1.393**
Euro=1 × trade –.203 –.440 –.203 .219
Y(t-1) .887*** .894*** .873***
Constant .054 –20.586*** –19.618*** .013 1.346 1.429 .052 –20.769*** –19.865*** –.011 2.138 .510
N 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000
R2 .300 .327 .404 .740 .750 .779 .893 .894 .896
R2 adj. .223 .246 .329
BIC –1347.274 –1338.369 –1390.221 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3),
respectively. Cross represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting
where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant




Table 13: Dependent Variable (Y) - NO2 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 13.430** 4.188 –3.327 10.774* .352 –8.561 13.430** 4.188 –3.327 –31.677*** 1.353 .303
Trade × RKL –8.548 10.570 32.410*** –6.759 21.024* 38.021*** –8.548 10.570 32.410*** 72.829*** 5.316 10.237*
Trade × (RKL)2 3.269 –9.925 –20.051*** 1.995 –11.586* –20.658*** 3.269 –9.925 –20.051*** –48.150*** –1.849 –4.851
Trade × RI –26.950*** –41.147*** –36.246*** –17.045** –45.805*** –27.337** –26.950** –41.147*** –36.246*** 12.296 –19.610*** –13.612***
Trade × (RI)2 –3.285 9.598** 8.335 –8.055* 8.067 1.867 –3.285 9.598* 8.335 –11.161 7.539*** 5.235**
I .021 .020 .017 .031** .042*** .033*** .021 .020 .017 .014 .005 .004
I2 .001*** .001*** .000** .001*** .000* .000** .001*** .001*** .000*** .000 .000 .000
KL .000 –.001 –.002 .001 –.001 –.002 .000 –.001 –.002 –.007* –.000 –.000
(KL)2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000* .000* –.000 .000
KL × I –.000*** –.000*** –.000** –.000*** –.000** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000 –.000 –.000
Trade × RLPC 33.228*** 50.829*** 52.823*** 66.848*** 33.228*** 50.829*** 5.091 8.634
Trade × (RLPC)2 –13.528** –21.998*** –26.222*** –34.102*** –13.528** –21.998*** –1.834 –3.918
FDI/K –.124 –.015 .153 .282 –.124 –.015 .087 .135
LPC 5.009 4.982 –2.893 –3.364 5.009** 4.982* .343 .188
(LPC)2 –.047 –.042 .201 .225 –.047 –.042 .024 .031
English=1 × Trade 12.231*** 9.535*** 12.231*** 1.768
Sea=1 × Trade –15.201*** –11.920** –15.201*** –4.088
Euro=1 × Trade –.842 –4.026*** –.842 –1.279*
Y(t-1) .716*** .833*** .824***
Constant 3.006*** –39.048 –39.098 2.760*** 12.015 14.520 2.987*** –39.317*** –39.687*** 4.084*** –4.691 –3.884
N 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000
R2 .493 .604 .623 .932 .947 .949 .986 .985 .985
R2 adj. .438 .557 .576
BIC 590.813 479.638 470.119 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross
represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent
variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use the first lag of Trade as an instrument for
its own level and correspondingly, to avoid the endogeneity problem of Trade and Income we instrument Income with its own second lag.
Table 14: Dependent Variable (Y) - CH4 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 2.415 3.793** –.587 1.348 –1.463 –9.856*** 2.415 3.793*** –.587 .592 .575 .471
Trade × RKL –4.302 –5.539 3.273 –3.081 5.239 16.067*** –4.302 –5.539* 3.273 –1.144 –.712 .008
Trade × (RKL)2 1.428 1.548 –2.527 .644 –3.096 –8.008*** 1.428 1.548 –2.527 1.429* 1.004* .638
Trade × RI –.784 –4.955* –1.594 2.421 –6.791** 1.086 –.784 –4.955 –1.594 –1.180 –2.483** –2.291**
Trade × (RI)2 –3.917*** –.578 –1.478 –5.272*** –.051 –2.408 –3.917* –.578 –1.478 –.165 .731 .649
I –.003 –.002 –.004 –.001 .003 –.002 –.003 –.002 –.004 .003* .003* .003*
I2 .000 .000 .000 .000 –.000 –.000 .000 .000 .000 –.000 –.000* –.000**
KL .002** .002*** .002** .002** .002** .001 .002*** .002*** .002*** –.000 –.000 –.000
(KL)2 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000
KL × I –.000 –.000 .000 –.000 .000 .000 –.000 –.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Trade × RLPC –.322 7.926*** 13.519*** 25.123*** –.322 7.926** .594 1.076
Trade × (RLPC)2 2.669 –1.650 –5.916*** –12.419*** 2.669 –1.650 .231 .031
FDI/K .045 .089 .211** .287*** .045 .089 .043** .047**
LPC –7.975*** –8.330*** –1.623** –1.148** –7.975*** –8.330*** –.379 –.410
(LPC)2 .472*** .490*** .102*** .071** .472*** .490*** .036* .038
English=1 × Trade 5.108*** 6.335*** 5.108*** .378*
Sea=1 × Trade –5.298*** –4.601*** –5.298*** –.617*
Euro=1 × Trade –.751* –1.847*** –.751 –.028
Y(t-1) .983*** .942*** .935***
Constant 1.135*** 34.144*** 35.940*** 1.114*** 7.265** 5.600** .823*** 34.194*** 35.904*** –.043 .388 .492
N 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000
R2 .452 .570 .609 .962 .970 .973 .997 .998 .998
R2 adj. .392 .519 .560
BIC –775.686 –884.926 –920.947 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3),
respectively. Cross represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting
where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant
coefficient. We use the first lag of Trade as an instrument for its own level and correspondingly, to avoid the endogeneity problem of Trade and Income we instrument Income with its own
second lag.
27
Table 15: Dependent Variable (Y) - SO2 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 151.651 509.999*** 188.542 155.573 336.747*** 150.845 151.651 509.999*** 188.542 –33.169 –15.019 –81.948
Trade × RKL –149.388 –944.618*** –628.450** –171.326 –643.473*** –340.220 –149.388 –944.618*** –628.450*** 80.803 20.814 27.713
Trade × (RKL)2 18.875 425.507*** 345.218** 20.233 237.753* 167.269 18.875 425.507*** 345.218*** –26.489 –5.108 –1.378
Trade × RI –79.027 404.815** 130.819 –26.311 417.185** 85.456 –79.027 404.815*** 130.819 –7.117 63.647 77.341
Trade × (RI)2 151.603 –161.794 –24.088 103.206 –127.375 2.869 151.603** –161.794** –24.088 –5.294 –40.233 –38.251
I –1.595*** –1.692*** –1.760*** –1.283*** –1.553*** –1.509*** –1.595*** –1.692*** –1.760*** –.031 –.076 –.114
I2 –.006 –.001 –.003 –.009** –.003 –.006 –.006 –.001 –.003 –.003** –.002 –.001
KL –.053 –.049 –.054 –.014 –.012 –.018 –.053 –.049 –.054 –.027 –.029 –.029
(KL)2 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000** –.000 –.000 –.000
KL × I .004** .003* .003** .004*** .003** .004*** .004*** .003*** .003*** .001** .001* .001*
Trade × RLPC –1046.338*** –594.941*** –940.207*** –647.604*** –1046.338*** –594.941*** –93.310 –31.308
Trade × (RLPC)2 630.402*** 412.126*** 650.653*** 547.696*** 630.402*** 412.126*** 74.039 32.995
FDI/K –19.683*** –20.651*** –8.397 –8.823 –19.683*** –20.651*** –3.560** –3.793**
LPC –715.236*** –735.637*** 13.683 9.310 –715.236*** –735.637*** –1.280 –16.641
(LPC)2 35.128*** 36.382*** –1.019 –.825 35.128*** 36.382*** .071 .814
English=1 × Trade 290.826*** 273.596*** 290.826*** 22.525
Sea=1 × Trade –55.812 –149.132 –55.812 36.779
Euro=1 × Trade 47.849 72.666** 47.849* –7.754
Y(t-1) .959*** .952*** .949***
Constant 52.876*** 3637.161*** 3721.856*** 43.767*** 9.589 36.305 56.093*** 3674.157*** 3759.385*** 4.191 11.354 91.825
N 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000
R2 .252 .366 .394 .818 .846 .853 .978 .978 .979
R2 adj. .170 .290 .317
BIC 4115.230 4050.999 4044.341 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross
represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent
variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use the first lag of Trade as an instrument for its
own level and correspondingly, to avoid the endogeneity problem of Trade and Income we instrument Income with its own second lag.
Table 16: Dependent Variable (Y) - Municipal Waste Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade –159.043 77.318 –75.287 –65.717 –342.436 –161.473 –159.043 77.318 –75.287 –33.169 244.617 8.379
Trade × RKL –134.351 –275.337 –262.249 –369.507 418.571 694.378 –134.351 –275.337 –262.249 80.803 –62.867 –300.990
Trade × (RKL)2 –1257.584 –1024.013 –1023.215 –1213.517 –1510.677* –1621.758* –1257.584 –1024.013 –1023.215 –26.489 –549.769 –416.560
Trade × RI 1369.082 608.804 713.950 1777.245* 551.533 143.372 1369.082* 608.804 713.950 –7.117 –366.285 –265.035
Trade × (RI)2 423.939 633.157 608.733 76.124 658.235 760.275 423.939 633.157 608.733 –5.294 747.936* 735.629
I –1.176 –.206 –.296 1.072 2.141 2.699* –1.176 –.206 –.296 –.031 –1.345 –1.498
I2 .030 .014 .015 .007 –.016 –.024 .030 .014 .015 –.003** .022 .025
KL .063 –.018 –.018 .376 .424 .456 .063 –.018 –.018 –.027 .155 .166
(KL)2 .000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.001 –.001 .000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000
KL × I –.006 –.005 –.005 –.002 .002 .004 –.006 –.005 –.005 .001** –.004 –.005
Trade × RLPC 2121.469 2259.357 2258.186** 2382.267** 2121.469 2259.357* 1878.644 1961.845
Trade × (RLPC)2 –2090.724** –2190.788** –1797.310** –1824.545** –2090.724** –2190.788** –1391.008 –1496.660
FDI/K –24.773 –24.869 34.510 35.069 –24.773 –24.869 11.363 9.575
LPC –3403.476*** –3438.238*** –382.451* –362.060* –3403.476*** –3438.238*** –1425.929*** –1494.023***
(LPC)2 170.290*** 171.919*** 19.824* 18.826* 170.290*** 171.919*** 73.247*** 76.421***
English=1 × Trade 33.995 135.763 33.995 –66.364
Sea=1 × Trade 85.536 –336.679 85.536 373.133
Euro=1 × Trade –34.676 106.386 –34.676 –50.128
Y(t-1) .959*** .548*** .549***
Constant 442.879*** 17213.363*** 17395.044*** 371.707*** 2177.816** 2066.016** 538.308*** 17458.501*** 17644.622*** 4.191 7174.902*** 7543.883***
N 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000
R2 .302 .333 .333 .883 .888 .888 .978 .926 .926
R2 adj. .225 .253 .249
BIC 6248.767 6253.577 6272.596 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a fixed effects
regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first
order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use the first lag of Trade as an instrument for its own level and correspondingly, to avoid the endogeneity
problem of Trade and Income we instrument Income with its own second lag.
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Table 17: Dependent Variable (Y) - SOx Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 438.653*** 732.205*** 515.662** 476.970*** 594.355*** 391.638* 438.653** 732.205*** 515.662* 274.211** 402.941** 292.922*
Trade × RKL 213.309 –427.169 –743.287* 182.331 –169.818 –362.581 213.309 –427.169 –743.287** 94.773 –170.343 –330.183
Trade × (RKL)2 –250.034 62.357 329.058 –233.854 –86.458 134.289 –250.034 62.357 329.058** –91.104 39.937 161.990
Trade × RI –755.998*** –432.476 –1194.091*** –844.929*** –510.255* –1335.257*** –755.998*** –432.476* –1194.091*** –496.122** –370.461** –652.493***
Trade × (RI)2 433.040*** 245.589 565.458*** 479.579*** 324.593** 652.212*** 433.040*** 245.589* 565.458*** 237.266** 162.536* 285.938**
I –.796** –.917** –.901** –.870** –1.084*** –.910** –.796** –.917*** –.901*** .147 .089 .060
I2 –.003 –.002 –.003 –.002 –.001 –.005 –.003 –.002 –.003 –.003 –.002 –.002
KL .063 .074 .102 .058 .078 .109 .063 .074 .102* .031 .037 .050
(KL)2 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000** –.000 –.000 –.000
KL × I .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .003 .002 .002 .002 .000 .000 .000
Trade × RLPC –625.376** –574.822* –460.461* –341.558 –625.376** –574.822** –341.605 –316.373
Trade × (RLPC)2 194.357 184.120 137.544 112.231 194.357 184.120 185.821 168.204
FDI/K –13.578 –19.801** –5.784 –9.664 –13.578** –19.801*** –4.357 –7.161
LPC –777.549*** –797.887*** –122.731** –122.969** –777.549*** –797.887*** –266.418* –291.707*
(LPC)2 40.074*** 41.432*** 7.007** 6.998** 40.074*** 41.432*** 13.647* 15.025*
English=1 × Trade 22.015 65.618 22.015 –1.255
Sea=1 × Trade 480.696*** 383.839** 480.696*** 237.232***
Euro=1 × Trade 140.195*** 157.350*** 140.195*** 47.519
Y(t-1) .705*** .693*** .683***
Constant 48.582*** 3783.632*** 3856.843*** 50.721*** 584.074** 586.594** 30.353*** 3799.568*** 3884.810*** –2.910 1296.426* 1419.641*
N 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000
R2 .571 .590 .604 .864 .870 .875 .943 .944 .944
R2 adj. .524 .540 .554
BIC 4534.381 4539.925 4537.536 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a fixed effects
regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first
order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use the first lag of Trade as an instrument for its own level and correspondingly, to avoid the endogeneity
problem of Trade and Income we instrument Income with its own second lag.
Table 18: Dependent Variable (Y) - NOx Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 510.439** 623.995** 623.769* 626.089*** 573.518** 654.780** 510.439* 623.995 623.769** 31.935 234.392 77.254
Trade × RKL –1218.091*** –1384.346*** –1659.153*** –1487.391*** –1363.608*** –1449.554*** –1218.091* –1384.346 –1659.153** –257.141 –602.063 –298.840
Trade × (RKL)2 650.985** 788.675*** 943.342*** 842.417*** 780.879*** 858.950*** 650.985 788.675 943.342* 179.763 417.101 302.115
Trade × RI –73.297 –141.443 –336.848 –210.409 –280.349 –709.921 –73.297 –141.443 –336.848 12.960 57.641 –44.939
Trade × (RI)2 –47.788 –98.678 –20.994 43.078 74.125 222.475 –47.788 –98.678 –20.994 –20.192 –135.666 –81.509
I 1.615*** 1.905*** 1.917*** 1.302*** 1.382*** 1.570*** 1.615*** 1.905*** 1.917*** .382 .588* .529
I2 –.024*** –.025*** –.024** –.023*** –.024*** –.027*** –.024* –.025* –.024* –.016 –.015 –.016
KL .225** .192* .206* .196* .192* .202* .225*** .192** .206** –.100 –.104 –.121
(KL)2 –.000 –.001* –.001* –.001 –.001 –.001* –.000 –.001* –.001* –.000 –.000 –.000
KL × I .002 .002 .002 .003 .003 .003 .002 .002 .002 .004 .003 .003
Trade × RLPC 331.132 196.738 213.228 139.304 331.132 196.738 –271.509 –14.491
Trade × (RLPC)2 –305.622 –243.342 –159.720 –91.384 –305.622 –243.342 135.638 24.855
FDI/K –15.171 –17.576 1.016 –1.551 –15.171* –17.576** –6.043 –5.402
LPC –968.443*** –978.249*** –7.063 –7.572 –968.443*** –978.249*** –714.643** –706.773**
(LPC)2 47.052*** 47.565*** .228 .261 47.052*** 47.565*** 33.880** 33.624**
English=1 × trade –106.264 –34.293 –106.264 197.601
Sea=1 × trade 263.334 83.454 263.334 –152.014
Euro=1 × trade 32.913 98.543 32.913 23.361
Y(t-1) .887*** .882*** .908***
Constant 2.401 4895.009*** 4940.852*** 10.292 55.080 55.539 –37.364*** 4899.683*** 4951.910*** 12.531 3726.927** 3676.561**
N 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000
R2 .264 .297 .300 .860 .867 .867 .896 .901 .902
R2 adj. .184 .213 .211
BIC 4892.574 4897.815 4914.428 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a fixed effects
regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first
order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use the first lag of Trade as an instrument for its own level and correspondingly, to avoid the endogeneity
problem of Trade and Income we instrument Income with its own second lag.
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Table 19: Dependent Variable (Y) - SF6 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 1146.531*** 1047.570*** –393.683 778.953*** 676.414*** 171.954 1146.531*** 1047.570*** –393.683** 144.405 168.982* 26.361
Trade × RKL –1966.129*** –1834.921*** –495.902 –1303.859*** –1123.200** –770.691* –1966.129*** –1834.921*** –495.902 –286.944 –273.553 –223.820
Trade × (RKL)2 853.353*** 719.847** 187.013 467.681* 403.031 184.676 853.353*** 719.847*** 187.013 158.412 170.728 164.510
Trade × RI –1688.055*** –1645.066*** –1038.524** –1051.300*** –1418.671*** 108.089 –1688.055*** –1645.066*** –1038.524** –128.179 –251.393 –286.185
Trade × (RI)2 649.963*** 691.788*** 600.863*** 414.265** 573.311*** –8.043 649.963*** 691.788*** 600.863*** 38.077 100.310 130.838
I 2.223*** 2.146*** 1.484*** 1.689*** 2.000*** .961** 2.223*** 2.146*** 1.484*** –.115 –.054 –.081
I2 –.005 –.002 –.002 –.004 –.005 –.001 –.005 –.002 –.002 –.003 –.004 –.004
KL .287*** .257** .208** .248** .190* .175* .287*** .257*** .208*** .066* .075** .077**
(KL)2 –.001** –.001 –.000 –.001* –.001* –.000 –.001*** –.001** –.000** –.000** –.000** –.000**
KL × I –.001 –.001 –.001 –.000 –.001 .000 –.001 –.001 –.001 .001 .001 .001
Trade × RLPC –53.194 1879.313*** 763.552** 621.979** –53.194 1879.313*** –68.633 108.809
Trade × (RLPC)2 c 436.087 –681.366** –172.987 –121.137 436.087*** –681.366*** 86.005 –11.818
FDI/K –13.462 –9.613 –16.937 –14.448 –13.462 –9.613 8.535 7.842
LPC 340.559 131.415 21.277 27.963 340.559** 131.415 –37.932 –55.260
(LPC)2 –15.390 –5.193 –1.989 –2.372 –15.390* –5.193 2.164 3.050
English=1 × Trade 983.307*** 269.189*** 983.307*** 84.328
Sea=1 × Trade –284.051 –229.031 –284.051* 37.981
Euro=1 × Trade –195.615*** –248.727*** –195.615*** –6.763
Y(t-1) .843*** .844*** .830***
Constant –24.760** –1842.822 –775.160 –16.978** –42.922 –59.300 21.663 –1808.789** –731.190 7.814 171.560 259.473
N 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000
R2 .277 .303 .420 .673 .685 .738 .913 .914 .914
R2 adj. .198 .220 .347
BIC 4843.110 4853.598 4765.967 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a fixed
effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account
for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use the first lag of Trade as an instrument for its own level and correspondingly, to avoid the
endogeneity problem of Trade and Income we instrument Income with its own second lag.
Table 20: Dependent Variable (Y) - NH3 Results
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 77.497*** 71.201*** 46.875** 71.295*** 52.310*** 2.063 77.497*** 71.201*** 46.875** 6.230 9.181 8.144
Trade × RKL –125.396*** –126.236*** –99.733*** –120.722*** –84.308*** –36.577 –125.396*** –126.236*** –99.733*** 6.901 –1.333 4.515
Trade × (RKL)2 71.069*** 61.002*** 50.321*** 67.323*** 45.607** 24.116 71.069*** 61.002*** 50.321** –3.606 –1.895 –7.925
Trade × RI –95.289*** –78.466*** –69.884** –71.026*** –84.639*** –39.895 –95.289*** –78.466*** –69.884** –33.084** –31.124** –2.152
Trade × (RI)2 18.617* 20.584* 19.658 6.489 17.476 4.459 18.617 20.584 19.658 9.468 10.318 –.801
I .039 .009 –.001 .070** .083** .069** .039 .009 –.001 .016 .013 .008
I2 .001* .001* .001 .001 .000 .000 .001 .001 .001 –.000 –.000 –.000
KL .004 .003 .002 .006 .005 .004 .004 .003 .002 –.000 –.001 –.002
(KL)2 .000 .000* .000* .000 .000 .000 .000* .000** .000*** –.000 –.000 .000
KL × I –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.000** –.000** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.000 –.000 –.000
Trade × RLPC 17.678 52.330* 85.104*** 149.168*** 17.678 52.330* 12.058 14.638
Trade × (RLPC)2 –19.408 –38.788** –62.589*** –100.310*** –19.408 –38.788** –12.822 –16.535
FDI/K –1.443* –1.364* –.549 .023 –1.443* –1.364* –.814* –.651
LPC 7.463 4.341 –2.026 –.937 7.463 4.341 –25.830*** –27.446***
(LPC)2 .006 .160 .232 .143 .006 .160 1.429*** 1.490***
English=1 × Trade 18.786** 28.211*** 18.786** –1.546
Sea=1 × Trade –8.276 –9.961 –8.276 –6.020
Euro=1 × Trade –2.786 –11.536*** –2.786 –6.244***
Y(t-1) .767*** .757*** .760***
Constant 10.878*** –57.779 –41.988 10.082*** 8.645 6.330 10.158*** –59.030 –43.175 2.254*** 119.278*** 128.782***
N 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000 580.000
R2 .673 .703 .707 .971 .973 .974 .991 .992 .992
R2 adj. .638 .667 .670
BIC 1612.765 1590.199 1600.220 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a
fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to
account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use the first lag of Trade as an instrument for its own level and correspondingly,
to avoid the endogeneity problem of Trade and Income we instrument Income with its own second lag.
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Table 21: Dependent Variable (Y) - HFC/PFC/SF6 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ˆTrade –1.866 –6.032*** –4.844* –.156 –.957 –.849 –1.866 –6.032** –4.844** –.392 –.899 –.943
ˆTrade × RKL .178 4.550 2.479 2.810 2.357 1.973 .178 4.550** 2.479 –.741 –.299 –.776
ˆTrade × (RKL)2 .975 –.157 –.077 –.510 –.319 –.231 .975* –.157 –.077 .823** .547 .573
ˆTrade × RI .280 –2.855 –.476 –1.257 –1.582 –.402 .280 –2.855 –.476 –.653 –.879 –.625
ˆTrade × (RI)2 1.910 3.649*** 3.072** 2.519** 2.708** 2.472** 1.910* 3.649*** 3.072*** .924 1.057* 1.006
I .008** .015*** .015*** .008** .008** .006 .008** .015*** .015*** .003 .003 .004
I2 –.000** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000***
KL –.001** –.002*** –.002*** –.001 –.001 –.001 –.001*** –.002*** –.002*** –.000 –.000 –.000
(KL)2 .000 .000** .000 .000 .000 .000 .000** .000*** .000** .000 –.000 –.000
KL × I –.000 –.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 –.000 –.000 .000 .000 .000 .000*
Poor=1 × ˆTrade .574 .576 .322 –.197 –.318 –.352 .574 .576 .322 .594 .956 1.041
ˆTrade × RLPC .164 1.048 2.056 1.656 .164 1.048 .336 .683
ˆTrade × (RLPC)2 .396 .044 –.124 –.062 .396 .044 .598 .520
FDI/K .111** .126** –.015 .012 .111** .126*** .047* .048*
LPC 4.351*** 5.168*** .066 .075 4.351*** 5.168*** –.297 .110
(LPC)2 –.250*** –.291*** –.006 –.006 –.250*** –.291*** .017 –.004
English=1 × ˆTrade –2.781** –.545 –2.781*** –.648
Sea=1 × ˆTrade –1.073 .571 –1.073* –.476
Euro=1 × ˆTrade –.040 –.423 –.040 .169
Y(t-1) .909*** .918*** .916***
Constant .123* –18.447*** –22.479*** .014 –.072 –.154 .175** –18.635*** –22.770*** .004 1.310 –.694
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .221 .273 .282 .706 .725 .728 .898 .900 .900
R2 adj. .138 .187 .193
BIC –1330.450 –1339.795 –1328.188 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3),
respectively. Cross represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting
where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant
coefficient. We use an instrumental variable approach where we instrument trade with a set of exogenous variables including lagged income, exchange rate, capital to labor ratio, price of
export, price of imports, land per capita, and four dummies for whether a country uses euro, has access to the sea or ocean, whether it uses English as its official language, and whether it
was a poor country at the start of the analysis period, respectively. We classify a country as poor if at the start of the sample its income was less than that of the European Average.
IV with Poor Dummy
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Table 22: Dependent Variable (Y) - NO2 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ˆTrade –20.727** 3.464 20.237* –8.523 13.901 35.629*** –20.727** 3.464 20.237* –17.721*** –8.934 –2.501
ˆTrade × RKL 58.101*** 51.873*** 27.012** 58.086*** 52.493*** 38.818*** 58.101*** 51.873*** 27.012* 20.709*** 15.308** 7.887
ˆTrade × (RKL)2 –10.840* –10.081 –8.854 –11.116* –7.924 –8.006 –10.840* –10.081* –8.854 –4.921* –3.077 –2.882
ˆTrade × RI –105.315*** –89.538*** –56.678*** –111.153*** –97.128*** –70.931*** –105.315*** –89.538*** –56.678*** –22.675*** –17.132** –7.494
ˆTrade × (RI)2 40.741*** 37.359*** 29.467*** 42.539*** 38.614*** 31.745*** 40.741*** 37.359*** 29.467*** 8.275*** 7.105** 5.069*
I .132*** .108*** .095*** .135*** .123*** .093*** .132*** .108*** .095*** .037*** .028*** .025***
I2 .000 .000 –.000 .000 .000 –.000 .000 .000 –.000 .000* .000 –.000
KL –.021*** –.020*** –.015*** –.020*** –.020*** –.016*** –.021*** –.020*** –.015*** –.006*** –.005*** –.004***
(KL)2 .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000**
KL × I –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*
Poor=1 × ˆTrade –24.352*** –18.426*** –22.838*** –30.845*** –24.466*** –31.224*** –24.352*** –18.426** –22.838*** 1.147 3.266 1.043
ˆTrade × RLPC –56.790*** –50.112*** –68.061*** –64.228*** –56.790*** –50.112*** –24.378*** –22.894***
ˆTrade × (RLPC)2 25.358*** 21.835*** 29.191*** 25.622*** 25.358*** 21.835*** 14.747*** 13.739**
FDI/K .091 .314 .106 .288 .091 .314 –.087 –.004
LPC 12.013** 18.354*** 2.023 .236 12.013*** 18.354*** .039 2.239
(LPC)2 –.510* –.820*** –.059 .040 –.510** –.820*** .029 –.077
English=1 × ˆTrade –33.553*** –17.795*** –33.553*** –11.179***
Sea=1 × ˆTrade –6.982 –4.584 –6.982*** –2.308
Euro=1 × ˆTrade –2.918* –6.033*** –2.918** –1.204*
Y(t-1) .835*** .817*** .798***
Constant 5.030*** –62.439** –94.591*** 4.620*** –9.323 –1.796 4.195*** –63.494*** –96.452*** .776*** –2.043 –13.518
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .545 .591 .621 .938 .944 .948 .984 .985 .985
R2 adj. .496 .543 .574
BIC 577.553 543.873 516.499 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents
a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e.,
Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use an instrumental variable approach where we instrument trade
with a set of exogenous variables including lagged income, exchange rate, capital to labor ratio, price of export, price of imports, land per capita, and four dummies for whether a country uses euro, has access
to the sea or ocean, whether it uses English as its official language, and whether it was a poor country at the start of the analysis period, respectively. We classify a country as poor if at the start of the sample its
income was less than that of the European Average.
Table 23: Dependent Variable (Y) - CH4 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ˆTrade .111 4.446 7.155** 4.283 8.000** 10.813*** .111 4.446 7.155** –4.153*** –2.278** –1.314
ˆTrade × RKL 7.887** 5.350 2.656 8.773** 10.342** 14.095*** 7.887 5.350 2.656 2.898** 2.067* .789
ˆTrade × (RKL)2 1.547 2.527 2.275 1.218 .323 –1.199 1.547 2.527 2.275 .082 .000 .077
ˆTrade × RI –37.497*** –33.674*** –31.095*** –37.890*** –36.932*** –39.085*** –37.497*** –33.674*** –31.095*** –4.045*** –2.903** –1.188
ˆTrade × (RI)2 15.104*** 13.404*** 12.664*** 15.462*** 15.258*** 15.543*** 15.104*** 13.404*** 12.664*** 1.040 .619 .225
I .045*** .040*** .044*** .041*** .035*** .035*** .045*** .040*** .044*** .010*** .007*** .006***
I2 –.000** –.000* –.000** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000** –.000** –.000*** .000 .000 .000
KL –.005*** –.004*** –.004*** –.004*** –.004*** –.004*** –.005*** –.004*** –.004*** –.001*** –.001** –.000
(KL)2 .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000** .000* .000
KL × I –.000*** –.000*** –.000** –.000*** –.000** –.000** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000*** –.000** –.000
Poor=1 × ˆTrade –10.535*** –8.192*** –8.916*** –11.931*** –11.450*** –13.011*** –10.535*** –8.192*** –8.916*** .575 1.012 .716
ˆTrade × RLPC –12.646*** –9.438** –2.571 2.026 –12.646*** –9.438** –1.228 –1.009
ˆTrade × (RLPC)2 6.964*** 5.792** .515 –1.804 6.964*** 5.792*** .708 .559
FDI/K .109 .129* .176** .190** .109 .129 .021 .034*
LPC –5.819*** –3.802** –1.208* –.727 –5.819*** –3.802*** –.549* –.322
(LPC)2 .316*** .212** .078** .050 .316*** .212*** .045** .034*
English=1 × ˆTrade –3.620** 4.066*** –3.620** –1.743**
Sea=1 × ˆTrade –4.330*** –4.032*** –4.330*** –.225
Euro=1 × ˆTrade .181 –.781 .181 –.214
Y(t-1) .936*** .933*** .930***
Constant 1.672*** 28.088*** 18.426** 1.558*** 5.852* 3.776 1.033*** 27.781*** 17.847*** .086** 1.315 .102
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .599 .620 .631 .970 .971 .972 .997 .998 .998
R2 adj. .556 .576 .586
BIC –936.009 –936.959 –935.530 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross
represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the
dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use an instrumental variable
approach where we instrument trade with a set of exogenous variables including lagged income, exchange rate, capital to labor ratio, price of export, price of imports, land per capita, and four dummies
for whether a country uses euro, has access to the sea or ocean, whether it uses English as its official language, and whether it was a poor country at the start of the analysis period, respectively. We
classify a country as poor if at the start of the sample its income was less than that of the European Average.
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Table 24: Dependent Variable (Y) - SO2 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ˆTrade 140.913 –25.293 120.959 280.057 –25.013 14.336 140.913 –25.293 120.959 82.362 29.564 –9.258
ˆTrade × RKL –410.579 –747.590** –50.439 –360.984 –531.120* –175.709 –410.579* –747.590*** –50.439 9.532 –11.195 93.093
ˆTrade × (RKL)2 –47.331 149.211 –7.109 –53.035 –8.744 –112.218 –47.331 149.211* –7.109 .122 8.363 –.794
ˆTrade × RI 359.719 367.281 –482.712 178.710 155.682 –382.932 359.719 367.281 –482.712* –191.713* –215.908** –342.568***
ˆTrade × (RI)2 14.828 –37.144 126.380 68.675 75.772 150.557 14.828 –37.144 126.380 115.000*** 127.130*** 155.342***
I –1.821*** –1.600*** –.919** –1.511*** –1.522*** –.714* –1.821*** –1.600*** –.919** .110 .129 .136
I2 –.017** –.013* –.005 –.020*** –.020*** –.013** –.017*** –.013** –.005 –.008*** –.008*** –.006***
KL –.014 –.046 –.174*** .010 .011 –.097 –.014 –.046 –.174*** –.012 –.017 –.037
(KL)2 –.000** –.000** –.000 –.000** –.001*** –.000** –.000** –.000** –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000
KL × I .007*** .007*** .003* .008*** .009*** .007*** .007*** .007*** .003** .002*** .002*** .001**
Poor=1 × ˆTrade –139.541 –215.489* –332.698*** –217.857** –299.540*** –316.751*** –139.541* –215.489** –332.698*** –61.359* –88.178** –85.970**
ˆTrade × RLPC 132.230 501.581* 704.419** 1038.795*** 132.230 501.581** 124.825 110.965
ˆTrade × (RLPC)2 110.966 –25.152 –161.276 –245.170 110.966 –25.152 –31.134 –22.929
FDI/K –18.626*** –22.144*** –10.662* –16.210*** –18.626*** –22.144*** –3.061* –4.035**
LPC –491.642*** –515.748*** –43.690 –5.907 –491.642*** –515.748*** 22.605 –15.888
(LPC)2 22.870*** 23.134*** 1.467 –.969 22.870*** 23.134*** –1.470 .388
English=1 × ˆTrade 930.004*** 567.546*** 930.004*** 153.079***
Sea=1 × ˆTrade –578.508*** –613.884*** –578.508*** 10.096
Euro=1 × ˆTrade 18.216 73.430** 18.216 2.912
Y(t-1) .944*** .936*** .923***
Constant 56.491*** 2639.332*** 2844.707*** 46.949*** 333.544* 207.034 56.155*** 2658.235*** 2859.975*** .239 –81.394 119.571
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .268 .343 .438 .810 .829 .854 .977 .978 .978
R2 adj. .189 .266 .369
BIC 4364.015 4329.911 4254.312 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a
fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to
account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use an instrumental variable approach where we instrument trade with a set of
exogenous variables including lagged income, exchange rate, capital to labor ratio, price of export, price of imports, land per capita, and four dummies for whether a country uses euro, has access to the sea or ocean,
whether it uses English as its official language, and whether it was a poor country at the start of the analysis period, respectively. We classify a country as poor if at the start of the sample its income was less than that
of the European Average.
Table 25: Dependent Variable (Y) - Municipal Waste Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ˆTrade 3021.297** 1993.435 1646.454 3163.664** 596.547 1519.707 3021.297** 1993.435 1646.454 1695.065* 1467.187 1298.979
ˆTrade × RKL –1836.250 –3114.955 –3855.397* –1369.902 –1261.777 –2287.160 –1836.250 –3114.955* –3855.397** –1324.310 –1933.582 –2547.508*
ˆTrade × (RKL)2 –1193.198 –489.013 –474.816 –1095.087 –1360.731 –1157.357 –1193.198* –489.013 –474.816 –569.446 –394.138 –354.751
ˆTrade × RI 2740.962 2412.069 2304.054 2184.627 1454.123 1309.635 2740.962 2412.069 2304.054 –171.451 –120.631 97.267
ˆTrade × (RI)2 –1306.750 –1738.204* –1713.181* –980.719 –925.658 –1078.474 –1306.750 –1738.204** –1713.181** –280.751 –520.599 –573.490
I –2.804 –1.829 1.351 –2.169 –1.527 .710 –2.804 –1.829 1.351 –.372 –.642 .915
I2 .033 .067 .053 .014 .025 .024 .033 .067* .053 .060** .071** .060**
KL .402 .367 .305 .529 .534 .427 .402 .367 .305 .262 .352 .355
(KL)2 –.001 –.001 –.002 –.001 –.002 –.002 –.001 –.001 –.002* –.000 –.001 –.001
KL × I .010 .006 .010 .010 .015 .015 .010 .006 .010 –.005 –.003 .000
Poor=1 × ˆTrade –3179.067*** –3692.498*** –3399.649*** –2741.386*** –3322.562*** –3353.017*** –3179.067*** –3692.498*** –3399.649*** –2070.441*** –2335.760*** –2182.219***
ˆTrade × RLPC 4081.362* 5047.127** 7178.579*** 7604.691*** 4081.362** 5047.127** 2317.591 2812.982
ˆTrade × (RLPC)2 –1886.143 –2079.614* –3489.960*** –3457.270*** –1886.143 –2079.614* –1044.892 –1144.019
FDI/K –57.973 –62.291 1.005 –31.871 –57.973* –62.291* –22.726 –24.300
LPC –3836.683*** –2849.186*** –586.658** –757.290*** –3836.683*** –2849.186*** –1500.966*** –972.057*
(LPC)2 189.963*** 139.268*** 27.740** 36.207** 189.963*** 139.268*** 77.294*** 50.273*
English=1 × ˆTrade –956.067 –579.293 –956.067 –782.519
Sea=1 × ˆTrade –1380.927** –1582.827** –1380.927*** –660.039*
Euro=1 × ˆTrade 537.605** 582.401** 537.605*** 282.263*
Y(t-1) .599*** .574*** .566***
Constant 390.237*** 19507.124*** 14792.090*** 348.269*** 3430.040*** 4309.365*** 436.554*** 19706.801*** 14869.457*** 197.691*** 7482.608*** 4881.028*
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .298 .350 .362 .860 .870 .873 .914 .916 .916
R2 adj. .222 .273 .283
BIC 6670.578 6655.911 6663.701 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a fixed effects regression where
we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the first order serial correlation effect. In all
regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use an instrumental variable approach where we instrument trade with a set of exogenous variables including lagged income, exchange rate, capital to labor ratio,
price of export, price of imports, land per capita, and four dummies for whether a country uses euro, has access to the sea or ocean, whether it uses English as its official language, and whether it was a poor country at the start of the analysis
period, respectively. We classify a country as poor if at the start of the sample its income was less than that of the European Average.
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Table 26: Dependent Variable (Y) - SOx Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ˆTrade 15.112 537.190 150.466 32.469 203.912 –283.963 15.112 537.190 150.466 204.481 372.270 94.820
ˆTrade × RKL 736.851* 109.694 981.445** 823.215* 532.755 1144.359** 736.851** 109.694 981.445** 251.250 75.183 419.562
ˆTrade × (RKL)2 –624.381*** –371.228* –463.907** –621.019*** –533.253** –614.976*** –624.381*** –371.228** –463.907*** –163.879** –95.673 –108.748
ˆTrade × RI –278.494 238.455 –941.694* –226.937 64.417 –965.452** –278.494 238.455 –941.694 –519.574 –355.224 –802.913**
ˆTrade × (RI)2 –6.946 –229.500 37.737 –.295 –84.981 140.938 –6.946 –229.500 37.737 215.837* 156.513 262.158*
I –1.144* –1.739*** –.986 –1.387** –1.686*** –.441 –1.144 –1.739** –.986* .290 .091 .199
I2 .010 .014 .030*** .009 .008 .020** .010 .014 .030*** –.007 –.006 .002
KL .047 .113 –.063 .042 .084 –.076 .047 .113 –.063 .030 .047 –.019
(KL)2 –.000 –.000 .000 –.000 –.000 .000 –.000 –.000 .000 –.000 –.000 .000
KL × I .002 .002 –.004 .002 .003 –.001 .002 .002 –.004 .001 .001 –.001
Poor=1 × ˆTrade –66.167 96.623 177.488 26.636 94.434 209.192 –66.167 96.623 177.488 –82.356 –31.041 51.819
ˆTrade × RLPC –1368.371*** –1341.353*** –770.981* –677.859 –1368.371*** –1341.353*** –500.157 –654.624*
ˆTrade × (RLPC)2 875.475*** 900.968*** 518.079* 563.152** 875.475*** 900.968*** 314.331 393.392*
FDI/K –10.400 –17.707* –.759 –7.337 –10.400 –17.707*** –3.618 –7.067
LPC –684.820*** –804.631*** –105.328 –40.670 –684.820*** –804.631*** –123.905 –235.334
(LPC)2 36.383*** 41.759*** 6.009* 2.235 36.383*** 41.759*** 6.703 12.274
English=1 × ˆTrade 1174.463*** 855.650*** 1174.463*** 464.688*
Sea=1 × ˆTrade –124.046 –247.819* –124.046 157.619**
Euro=1 × ˆTrade 109.405* 165.227*** 109.405* 45.522
Y(t-1) .752*** .745*** .729***
Constant 61.355*** 3247.792*** 3903.412*** 59.805*** 514.142* 259.437 38.233*** 3262.794*** 3931.152*** –6.510 567.605 1136.098*
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .539 .556 .585 .842 .848 .858 .939 .940 .942
R2 adj. .490 .504 .533
BIC 4889.047 4898.758 4877.429 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a fixed effects
regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account for the
first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use an instrumental variable approach where we instrument trade with a set of exogenous variables
including lagged income, exchange rate, capital to labor ratio, price of export, price of imports, land per capita, and four dummies for whether a country uses euro, has access to the sea or ocean, whether it uses English as
its official language, and whether it was a poor country at the start of the analysis period, respectively. We classify a country as poor if at the start of the sample its income was less than that of the European Average.
Table 27: Dependent Variable (Y) - NOx Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ˆTrade 1087.354*** 1137.115** 555.519 778.509** 619.365 164.784 1087.354** 1137.115** 555.519 211.610 73.261 –127.478
ˆTrade × RKL –1063.123** –1435.337** –1183.773** –1295.562** –1126.112** –1049.496* –1063.123** –1435.337*** –1183.773*** 122.359 20.138 137.750
ˆTrade × (RKL)2 655.681*** 846.564*** 910.238*** 798.466*** 717.107*** 774.890*** 655.681*** 846.564*** 910.238*** 38.630 187.350 209.150
ˆTrade × RI –887.895 –761.011 –1169.145* –513.134 –709.261 –1113.970* –887.895** –761.011* –1169.145*** –317.299 –298.927 –534.686
ˆTrade × (RI)2 377.464 229.245 352.809 270.972 329.487 452.070* 377.464* 229.245 352.809* 184.711 113.516 176.603
I 2.269*** 2.268*** 2.285*** 1.972*** 2.078*** 2.636*** 2.269*** 2.268*** 2.285*** .634* 1.060* 1.202**
I2 –.026** –.019 –.009 –.026** –.026** –.022* –.026 –.019 –.009 –.022 –.016 –.012
KL .217* .219* .161 .185 .194 .150 .217** .219* .161 –.123* –.200* –.228**
(KL)2 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 –.000 .000 .000
KL × I –.001 –.002 –.005 –.001 –.000 –.002 –.001 –.002 –.005 .003 .000 –.001
Poor=1 × ˆTrade 62.234 40.270 248.503 214.251 171.935 317.533 62.234 40.270 248.503 108.029 122.474 196.765
ˆTrade × RLPC 64.839 –331.377 678.351 454.094 64.839 –331.377 –425.984 –521.101*
ˆTrade × (RLPC)2 –22.513 158.461 –346.527 –218.080 –22.513 158.461 204.725 255.537*
FDI/K –10.823 –15.118 3.557 –.819 –10.823 –15.118** –3.697 –5.824
LPC –814.742*** –953.121*** 1.825 3.268 –814.742*** –953.121*** –583.812** –623.513**
(LPC)2 41.083*** 48.364*** –.147 –.217 41.083*** 48.364*** 27.110** 29.167**
English=1 × ˆTrade 347.605 87.200 347.605** 191.882
Sea=1 × ˆTrade 524.778*** 297.391 524.778*** 126.615
Euro=1 × ˆTrade 87.186 150.231** 87.186* 45.107
Y(t-1) .883*** .905*** .891***
Constant –17.234 3974.374*** 4631.831*** –3.282 –8.688 –9.024 –47.632*** 3980.077*** 4659.438*** 6.194 3098.849** 3296.999**
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .295 .315 .328 .869 .873 .876 .904 .908 .909
R2 adj. .219 .234 .245
BIC 5121.309 5135.918 5142.777 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a fixed
effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account
for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use an instrumental variable approach where we instrument trade with a set of exogenous
variables including lagged income, exchange rate, capital to labor ratio, price of export, price of imports, land per capita, and four dummies for whether a country uses euro, has access to the sea or ocean, whether it uses
English as its official language, and whether it was a poor country at the start of the analysis period, respectively. We classify a country as poor if at the start of the sample its income was less than that of the European
Average.
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Table 28: Dependent Variable (Y) - SF6 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ˆTrade –1102.338** –1072.048** –61.866 –413.807 –236.345 179.137 –1102.338*** –1072.048** –61.866 –361.686** –511.641** –431.760**
ˆTrade × RKL –531.802 –778.543 –1348.162** –139.200 –784.966 –789.498 –531.802 –778.543* –1348.162*** –305.879* –157.596 –199.562
ˆTrade × (RKL)2 511.828* 657.422** 585.815** 281.425 512.381* 360.624 511.828*** 657.422*** 585.815** 170.291** 114.080 103.630
ˆTrade × RI –77.817 –43.248 907.451 –459.760 –263.280 165.300 –77.817 –43.248 907.451* 154.079 41.057 77.210
ˆTrade × (RI)2 262.534 288.552 26.159 437.326* 322.028 165.805 262.534 288.552 26.159 15.332 61.151 48.629
I 3.197*** 3.332*** 2.877*** 2.436*** 2.435*** 1.947*** 3.197*** 3.332*** 2.877*** .139 .283 .396
I2 –.011 –.010 –.028** –.016 –.011 –.012 –.011 –.010 –.028*** –.005 –.006* –.008**
KL –.219* –.308** –.166 –.130 –.159 –.126 –.219*** –.308*** –.166** .016 .013 .015
(KL)2 .000 .000 –.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 –.000 –.000* –.000 –.000*
KL × I –.003 –.004 .002 –.002 –.002 –.001 –.003 –.004 .002 .002 .002 .002*
Poor=1 × ˆTrade 207.237 40.402 –317.115 52.303 –184.348 –301.105* 207.237 40.402 –317.115 159.667 165.004 137.262
ˆTrade × RLPC –235.563 288.494 129.641 487.703 –235.563 288.494 219.921 311.743
ˆTrade × (RLPC)2 101.229 –165.866 –171.353 –360.932 101.229 –165.866 –83.122 –118.007
FDI/K –28.850** –20.036* –37.486*** –36.787*** –28.850 –20.036 6.065 6.324
LPC 395.617 569.040** –42.208 –78.940* 395.617** 569.040*** 40.311 87.733
(LPC)2 –22.286* –31.242** 1.713 3.614 –22.286** –31.242*** –2.488 –4.983
English=1 × ˆTrade –783.441*** –34.163 –783.441*** –52.541
Sea=1 × ˆTrade –662.600*** –482.809*** –662.600*** –129.803*
Euro=1 × ˆTrade –199.514*** –160.199** –199.514*** 1.035
Y(t-1) .857*** .860*** .856***
Constant 38.994*** –1681.992 –2528.203** 17.502* 271.358 446.203** 79.001*** –1661.958** –2536.270*** 15.987** –145.241 –374.369
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .193 .216 .255 .639 .649 .666 .922 .923 .923
R2 adj. .106 .124 .163
BIC 5190.243 5204.141 5192.588 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a fixed
effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account
for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use an instrumental variable approach where we instrument trade with a set of exogenous
variables including lagged income, exchange rate, capital to labor ratio, price of export, price of imports, land per capita, and four dummies for whether a country uses euro, has access to the sea or ocean, whether it uses
English as its official language, and whether it was a poor country at the start of the analysis period, respectively. We classify a country as poor if at the start of the sample its income was less than that of the European
Average.
Table 29: Dependent Variable (Y) - NH3 Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependance Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ˆTrade 52.836* 144.193*** 170.568*** 99.291*** 172.779*** 203.010*** 52.836* 144.193*** 170.568*** –17.192 21.499 44.384**
ˆTrade × RKL –74.565** –132.854*** –156.625*** –76.666** –112.642*** –108.886*** –74.565* –132.854*** –156.625*** 24.608 –12.064 –31.378
ˆTrade × (RKL)2 64.841*** 80.118*** 82.973*** 64.800*** 79.888*** 73.150*** 64.841*** 80.118*** 82.973*** –1.202 13.258 14.472
ˆTrade × RI –152.716*** –87.610** –35.577 –179.347*** –137.089*** –101.358** –152.716*** –87.610** –35.577 –58.791*** –29.670 3.968
ˆTrade × (RI)2 57.185*** 38.913** 26.848 64.537*** 52.566*** 45.325** 57.185*** 38.913* 26.848 24.572** 11.670 3.566
I .150*** .040 –.045 .187*** .127** .037 .150*** .040 –.045 .088*** .050* .010
I2 .002* .002* .001 .001 .001 .000 .002* .002* .001 –.000 .000 –.000
KL –.015* –.008 .001 –.012 –.010 –.003 –.015** –.008 .001 –.011*** –.008** –.003
(KL)2 .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000* .000* .000
KL × I –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.001*** –.000 –.000* –.000
Poor=1 × ˆTrade –16.380 –5.905 –16.000 –48.987*** –38.267** –56.702*** –16.380 –5.905 –16.000 13.239 18.497** 10.498
ˆTrade × RLPC –162.880*** –177.232*** –157.713*** –148.483*** –162.880*** –177.232*** –71.607** –72.259***
ˆTrade × (RLPC)2 79.380*** 80.146*** 69.161*** 56.726** 79.380*** 80.146*** 35.101** 32.830**
FDI/K –1.725** –1.324* –1.238 –.488 –1.725* –1.324 –.794 –.531
LPC 22.457 11.268 8.331 6.802 22.457 11.268 –28.902*** –30.328***
(LPC)2 –.760 –.157 –.247 –.160 –.760 –.157 1.597*** 1.686***
English=1 × ˆTrade –32.821** –8.604 –32.821** –25.212***
Sea=1 × ˆTrade 24.259* 13.984 24.259*** 2.558
Euro=1 × ˆTrade –14.407*** –20.638*** –14.407*** –7.870***
Y(t-1) .772*** .759*** .753***
Constant 12.848*** –130.296* –80.142 11.120*** –45.371 –40.260 11.831*** –131.215 –79.633 3.112*** 134.024*** 139.110***
N 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000 609.000
R2 .636 .683 .691 .962 .967 .968 .989 .990 .990
R2 adj. .597 .645 .653
BIC 1868.714 1817.809 1819.906 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross represents a fixed
effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting where we add one lag of the dependent variable (i.e., Y(t-1)) to account
for the first order serial correlation effect. In all regressions, a second lag does not appear to yield a significant coefficient. We use an instrumental variable approach where we instrument trade with a set of exogenous
variables including lagged income, exchange rate, capital to labor ratio, price of export, price of imports, land per capita, and four dummies for whether a country uses euro, has access to the sea or ocean, whether it uses
English as its official language, and whether it was a poor country at the start of the analysis period, respectively. We classify a country as poor if at the start of the sample its income was less than that of the European
Average.
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